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A performance standard 
sets a limit on the amount 
of emissions that can be 
released per unit of 
electricity generated.  
 
A portfolio standard 
requires electricity 
distributors to purchase 
certificates from qualifying 
low-emissions generators 
equal to a given share of 
their sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A Clean Energy Standard designed as a share-of-sales requirement on retail electricity suppliers can 
be a viable, cost-effective option for Massachusetts as long as generation resources that will not 
contribute to new greenhouse gas emission reductions do not receive windfall payments. 
This report describes Synapse Energy Economics’ (Synapse) analysis of the Clean Energy Performance Standard 
described in the Global Warming Solutions Act’s Massachusetts Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020 (CECP) 
on behalf of MassCEC and the Massachusetts Departments of Energy Resources, Environmental Protection, 
and Public Utilities (the “Agencies”). Throughout this report we refer to the Clean Energy Performance 
Standard as a “Clean Energy Standard” (CES) to emphasize that policy designs under consideration include 
both performance standards and portfolio standards.  
Analysis of the CECP’s Clean Energy Standard 
The specific issues designated for study by MassCEC and the Agencies included: 
 The approach, successes, difficulties and status of CESs in jurisdictions other than 
Massachusetts; 
 Qualitative advantages and disadvantages of various approaches to implementing a CES to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector; and 
 Costs and greenhouse gas emission reductions that could be achieved from various levels of or 
approaches to a CES, using transparent assumptions consistent with existing programs in 
Massachusetts that are reducing or will reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity 
sector. 
After examining CES policy designs implemented in the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and six U.S. states, and making a qualitative assessment of six 
potential CES designs for Massachusetts, Synapse—in consultation with 
MassCEC and the Agencies—selected the design that was both politically viable 
and technically feasible for further modeling: a portfolio standard requiring 
load-serving-entities (LSEs) to purchase Clean Energy Certificates (CECs) equal 
to a designated share of their retail sales. This approach would require a 
system of tradable credits; eligible generators would generate a CEC (or a 
portion of a CEC) with each megawatt-hour (MWh) produced. Compliance 
verification could be accomplished with modifications to existing reporting 
systems. This design closely resembles the existing Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) in Massachusetts. 
Power-plant-based pounds (lbs) per MWh performance standards, limitations to or requirements on 
electricity-sector contracts, and requirements on electricity suppliers to purchase Regional Greenhouse Gas 
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Initiative allowances were all removed from consideration as potential CES designs for Massachusetts on 
grounds of a lack of political viability or particular technical obstacles to implementation in the 
Commonwealth. LSE-based lbs/MWh performance standards have not been proposed or established in any 
other jurisdiction, and come with significant administrative and design hurdles, and were also removed from 
consideration. LSE-based performance standards were not found to possess any advantage over LSE-based 
portfolio standards in terms of their technological neutrality or vulnerability to resource shuffling: 
 Both performance and portfolio standards can be designed to be “technology 
neutral”—or not. (A CES policy is technology neutral if all electricity generating technologies 
are allowed to participate, and their participation is managed by a technology independent 
criterion such as carbon intensity, as opposed to a CES policy that does not allow certain 
technologies to participate.) Either a performance or portfolio standard could be designed to 
achieve a certain emission reduction goal instead of being benchmarked against a particular 
generation technology. 
 Resource shuffling is unavoidable for LSE-based performance and portfolio standards 
in New England, but a well-designed Massachusetts CES can succeed despite 
shuffling. (Shuffling refers to a situation in which LSEs can comply with a CES standard simply 
by acquiring energy from a different existing generator or acquiring credits from existing 
generators.) CES eligibility terms must ensure a “binding” policy—a CES that cannot be 
complied with solely by shuffling CECs from existing generation. 
Design of Synapse’s CES Policy Model 
We designed the CES Policy Model to demonstrate the impacts of an LSE-based portfolio standard on emission 
reductions and costs to ratepayers. The model’s Reference Case assumes that all CECP electricity-sector 
emission reduction strategies, except the Clean Energy Imports strategy and the Clean Energy Performance 
Standard, will be accomplished. The sole difference between the Reference and Policy Cases is the 
implementation of a CES. Model results depend both on the basic type of CES design chosen and on the details 
assumed regarding its implementation in the model.  
Three key simplifying assumptions were made in order to produce a model with sufficient flexibility to provide 
MassCEC and the Agencies with a tool that could be used to explore a wide range of policy assumptions, 
without significant per-scenario costs: 
1. CECs assigned to generation resources and purchased by LSEs have the same price as 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). This assumption is driven, in part, by the high future demand 
for renewables expected to come as a result of Massachusetts’ ambitious existing Renewable 
Portfolio Standard policy. 
2. CEC purchases stimulate investment in new zero-carbon resources and imports, thereby 
displacing existing natural gas generation. The CES does not stimulate more natural gas 
generation or displace existing coal and oil, which are very nearly retired by 2030 in the 
Reference Case. 
3. The mix of the various zero-carbon resources and imports added will be a policy choice and is, 
therefore, a fixed input into the model—and not an output, or policy conclusion, of the model. 
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A different policy design choice or different implementation strategy might result in different costs or changes 
to other modeling results. The rationale behind these assumptions is discussed in detail in the report. 
CES Policy Model results also depend on user choices. The results presented here are based on modeling 
“runs” using varying assumptions regarding assigning CECs to particular types of resources, requiring municipal 
light plants (MLPs) to comply with a CES, the share of LSEs’ sales requiring CECs, the future growth of retail 
electricity sales, and emission reduction targets. All model runs shown here, however, use identical 
assumptions for all other modeling parameters including assessing policy implementation for 2020 and 2030, 
and implementation in Massachusetts only. 
The policy targets explored in our analysis included GWSA electricity-sector target emissions levels (12,400 
short tons (sT) in 2020 and 8,400 sT in 2030), and emission reductions equal to 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 times the 
emission reductions expected from the Clean Energy Imports strategy in the CECP (5.5 million sT). Modeling 
results are presented as “deltas,” or the difference between Policy Case and Reference Case results. 
Key Conclusions from CES Policy Model Analysis 
Overall, our analysis concludes that a CES designed as an LSE portfolio standard can be a viable, cost-effective 
option for Massachusetts as long as “windfall” CEC payments are not made to owners of resources, such as 
nuclear and natural gas, that will not (in the policy as modeled) contribute to new (additional) greenhouse gas 
emission reductions. Exploration of CES Policy Model results under various combinations of assumptions 
resulted in the following five findings: 
CES Modeling is Not Viable for Years Later than 2030 
Given current plant licenses, it seems likely that by 2050 there will be no nuclear generation facilities operating 
in New England. The loss of 22 percent of expected 2030 generation will be a massive, unprecedented 
planning challenge for New England. It is far more likely that the fuel mix of the resources necessary to replace 
nuclear generation will be determined by policy choices than by the dynamics of a potential future CES market. 
In the CES Policy Model, 2040 and 2050 results are swamped by the assumption that natural gas will replace 
exiting nuclear generation in the Reference Case. For this reason, we do not present Policy-Case modeling 
results for 2040 and 2050 in this report. 
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Figure ES-1. Reference Case Generation Mix 
 
The Share of Sales Requiring CECs Determines the Cost to Ratepayers 
Customer utility bill increases due to CES are determined by the stringency of the requirement on LSEs—what 
share of load they must cover with CEC purchases, and whether or not MLPs are required to comply. What 
resources are assigned how many credits has little impact on the price to consumers (with the exception of an 
alternative formulation of the CES policy discussed below). Choosing a constant CEC threshold (such that 
generators with an CO2 emission rate above the threshold do not qualify to be assigned CECs) and varying the 
share of LSEs’ sales required to hold CECs allows for more flexibility in costs to rate payers and in the range of 
achievable emission reductions. In the scenarios that follow we have set the CEC threshold to 2,000 lbs/MWh. 
Except where mentioned explicitly, all modeling results discussed in this report are based on achieving the 
emission reductions expected from the Clean Energy Imports strategy in the CECP (5.5 million sT). 
CES Does Not Reduce Emissions If Nuclear Power is Assigned CECs 
The likely outcome of including nuclear generation in a CES would be windfall profits to nuclear facilities. 
Providing rewards to nuclear plants will not increase nuclear generation in New England. With nuclear facilities 
assigned CECs, there is no change in regional emissions, but residential customers nonetheless see their utility 
bills grow by 4 percent in 2020 and 6 percent in 2030 with respect to the Reference Case (see Table ES-1). The 
remaining scenarios shown below assume that existing nuclear generation will not be assigned CES credit. 
Table ES-1. CES Delta Bill Impacts: Includes Nuclear and Includes MLPs 
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Excluding MLPs from Compliance Raises Costs 
Costs and emission reductions depend, in part, on whether or not MLPs are required to comply with the CES. If 
MLPs are excluded from compliance, the cost to ratepayers would be higher to achieve the same emission 
reduction. With MLPs included, costs to residential ratepayers grow by 6 percent in 2020 and 10 percent in 
2030 with respect to the Reference Case. With MLPs excluded, ratepayers costs grow by 7 percent in 2020 and 
11 percent in 2030 with respect to the Reference Case (see Tables ES-2 and ES-3). 
Table ES-2. CES Delta Bill Impacts: Excludes Nuclear and Includes MLPs 
 
Table ES-3. CES Delta Bill Impacts: Excludes Nuclear and MLPs 
 
The remaining scenarios shown in this report assume that MLPs will comply with CES. Table ES-4 displays the 
base result: nuclear generation is excluded from receiving CECs; MLPs are required to comply; and the CEC 
threshold is set at 2,000 lbs/MWh. In this scenario, LSEs must be required to hold CECs for 73 percent of their 
sales in 2020 and 82 percent in 2030 in order to achieve a 5.5 million sT target emission reduction. Residential 
customers’ monthly utility bills rise by 6 percent with respect to the Reference Case in 2020 and 10 percent in 
2030. 
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Table ES-4. CES Delta Results: Excludes Nuclear and Includes MLPs; Threshold = 2,000 lbs/MWh 
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Assigning CECs to Natural Gas Raises Costs 
Because the 2015 Massachusetts average emission rate (660 lbs/MWh) is lower than the average of the 
combined-cycle plants that represent the vast majority of natural gas resources in New England (1,080 
lbs/MWh), the CES cannot achieve emission reductions by stimulating more dispatch of or new investment in 
natural gas resources. CEC prices paid to natural gas generators, therefore, are a windfall: these resources’ 
owners would receive payments without changing dispatch or investing in new resources. 
Excluding resources with emission rates greater than the 2015 Massachusetts average from receiving CECs 
would have dramatic results; the effect of this exclusion, of course, is to preclude natural gas generators from 
receiving CECs. With the same assumptions as shown above in Table ES-4—nuclear excluded and MLPs 
required to comply—an additional exclusion of resources with emission rates greater than 660 lbs/MWh 
lowers both the share of sales requiring CECs and costs to ratepayers (see Table ES-5). 
Table ES-5. CES Delta Results: With 660 lbs/MWh Cap on Resources Receiving CECs 
 
In this scenario, with natural gas resources excluded from receiving CES credit, the share of sales for which 
LSEs are required to hold CECs falls to 29 percent in 2020 and 39 percent in 2030. Residential customers’ utility 
bills increase by just 2 percent with respect to the Reference Case in both 2020 and 2030, in comparison to 6 
and 10 percent, respectively, with natural gas participating in the CES. Natural gas is still displaced, and 
emissions still fall by 5.5 million sT, but no CES payments are made to the natural gas plants that continue to 
operate. 
In This Report 
This report begins in Section 2 with a brief overview of Synapse’s analysis of potential CES policies for 
Massachusetts, along with the key policy conclusions and other findings that were developed as a result of our 
CES modeling exercise. Sections 3, 4, and 5 provide a description of our study of CES design options, presented 
in the order in which this analysis was conducted. Sections 3 reviews our research into CES policies in 
jurisdictions other than Massachusetts. Section 4 recounts our qualitative analysis of six potential CES designs 
for Massachusetts, and the process of narrowing these options down to the one design—the LSE-base 
portfolio standard—explored in modeling. The report concludes with Section 5, which describes the 
methodology and data used in the CES modeling exercise in detail, reports on sensitivity analyses, and offers 
caveats with regards to the use of the CES Policy Model results. 
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Throughout this report the 
CECP’s Clean Energy 
Performance Standard is 
referred to as a “Clean 
Energy Standard” (CES) to 
emphasize that not all 
such standards are 
designed as power-plant-
directed “performance” 
regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS OF THE CES POLICY MODEL 
Synapse Energy Economics (Synapse) was engaged by MassCEC and the Massachusetts Departments of Energy 
Resources, Environmental Protection, and Public Utilities (the “Agencies”) to analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of various approaches to implementing the Clean Energy Performance Standard described in 
the Global Warming Solutions Act’s1 (GWSA’s) Massachusetts Clean 
Energy and Climate Plan for 2020
2
 (CECP). Throughout this report we refer 
to the Clean Energy Performance Standard as a “Clean Energy Standard” 
(CES) to emphasize that policy designs under consideration include both 
“performance standards” and “portfolio standards.” The specific issues 
designated for study by MassCEC and the Agencies included: 
 The approach, successes, difficulties and status of CESs in 
jurisdictions other than Massachusetts (see Section 3); 
 Qualitative advantages and disadvantages of various approaches 
to implementing a CES to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
the electricity sector (see Section 4); and 
 Costs and greenhouse gas emission reductions that could be 
achieved from various levels of or approaches to a CES, using transparent assumptions consistent with 
existing programs in Massachusetts that are reducing or will reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
the electricity sector (see Section 5). 
 
This report begins, here in Section 2, with a brief overview of the process by which the numerous possible CES 
policy designs were narrowed to the particular design—a portfolio standard in which prices for Renewable 
Energy Certificates (RECs) and prices for a new set of Clean Energy Certificates (CECs) are closely related—and 
the key conclusions drawn from the analysis performed for MassCEC and the Agencies. Additional sensitivity 
analysis on the results presented here is reported in Section 5.4. 
2.1. Overview of Policy Design Selection 
Our analysis for MassCEC and the Agencies began with a review of CES policy designs that have been 
implemented in the United Kingdom and Canada, and in six U.S. states, as well as several proposed and current 
U.S. federal standards. We identified six potential CES designs for Massachusetts, but narrowed these 
choices—for reasons of political and technical feasibility—to two types of standards that we then subjected to 
a more thorough qualitative assessment, as depicted in Table 1. 
                                                          
1
  Chapter 298 of the Acts of 2008. https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2008/Chapter298. 
2
 Office of the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs. December 2010. Massachusetts Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020. 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/2020-clean-energy-plan.pdf 
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CES eligibility terms must 
ensure a “binding” policy—
a CES that cannot be 
complied with by simply 
shuffling certificates or 
credits from existing 
generation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Narrowing CES Policy Options 
 
The two policies designs that receive that most detailed qualitative analysis both require the compliance of 
Massachusetts retail electricity suppliers, or “load-serving entities” (LSEs): 
LSE Performance Standard: This CES design requires electricity suppliers to meet an average emission rate 
for their load. Qualitative analysis determined that compliance would be difficult to verify, even using the 
existing New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) Generation Information System (GIS) tracking system, as 
Massachusetts only has authority to require emissions reporting by in-state power plants, among other 
limitations. 
LSE Portfolio Standard: This CES design requires electricity suppliers to cover a given portion of their load 
with credits from relatively low- or no-carbon sources (e.g., CECs). This approach would require a system of 
tradable credits; eligible plants would generate a credit (or a portion of a credit) with each megawatt-hour 
(MWh) produced. As with Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) policies that require RECs, LSEs would be 
required to hold credits covering a defined percentage of their total sales. Compliance verification could be 
accomplished with modifications to the existing NEPOOL GIS reporting system. 
More generally, the findings of our detailed qualitative analysis were as follows: 
Resource shuffling is unavoidable for LSE performance and portfolio standards in New England, but a well-
designed Massachusetts CES can succeed despite shuffling.  
Because Massachusetts suppliers source their electricity from the larger Independent System Operator-New 
England (ISO-NE) supply region, there is the potential for “shuffling,”3 such that LSEs could buy all of the 
certificates or credits they need from existing generators, operating at 
current generation levels, without any change in overall carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions. Shuffling will occur to some degree, but a well-designed 
Massachusetts CES can, nonetheless, succeed. 
CES eligibility terms must ensure a “binding” policy—a CES that cannot be 
complied with by simply shuffling certificates or credits from existing 
generation. One approach would be to adjust the “stringency” of the CES 
                                                          
3
 Shuffling refers to a situation in which LSEs can comply with a CES standard simply by acquiring energy from a different existing 
generator or acquiring credits from existing generators. In the extreme case, the standard could be met without changing plant 
build/retirement decisions or the dispatch of existing plants.  
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Either a performance or 
portfolio standard could be 
designed to achieve a 
certain goal—such as the 
CECP’s 2020 electricity-
sector greenhouse gas 
emission target or Clean 
Energy Imports strategy 
emission reductions—
instead of being 
benchmarked against a 
particular generation 
technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based upon the analysis 
discussed in this report 
and the direction provided 
by MassCEC and the 
Agencies, Synapse focused 
its modeling analysis on 
the LSE portfolio standard 
design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(the maximum average emission rate or the share of load for which LSEs are required to purchase credits) to 
the degree that real changes in the region’s dispatch order and/or built infrastructure are necessary in order 
for Massachusetts LSEs to comply with the CES. 
Both performance and portfolio standards can be designed to be “technology neutral”—or not.  
In weighing the performance and portfolio standards, it is important to 
recognize that both can be designed to be “technology neutral”—or 
not. While performance standards’ criterion is a neutral metric (pounds 
(lbs) of CO2 per MWh), the selection of the stringency will be made with 
full knowledge of the respective emissions rates of each resource type and 
class of plants. Setting a performance standard at 2,000 lbs/MWh (slightly 
lower than the typical emission rate of a conventional coal plant) will have 
a very different impact on dispatch by technology type than would a 800 
lbs/MWh standard (slightly lower than the typical emission rate of a 
combined-cycle gas plant). 
In a technology-neutral LSE portfolio standard, credits would be assigned 
in proportion to each resource’s effective emission reduction in relation to 
the emissions rate of a particular resource or class of resources. For 
example, Fore River Station 1, a natural gas combined-cycle plant with a 
838 lbs/MWh emission rate, could receive 0.36, 0.56, or 0.62 credits for each MWh of generation, respectively, 
depending on the choice of reference resource: 1,300 lbs/MWh (an average natural gas combustion turbine); 
1,900 lbs/MWh (an average oil steam turbine); or 2,200 lbs/MWh (coal steam turbine). 
Alternatively, either a performance or portfolio standard could be designed to achieve a certain goal—such as 
the CECP’s 2020 electricity-sector greenhouse gas emission target or Clean Energy Imports strategy emission 
reductions—instead of being benchmarked against a particular generation technology. 
Synapse’s qualitative analysis of CES designs identified several disadvantages of implementing an LSE 
performance standard in Massachusetts.  
An LSE performance standard, stated in pounds emitted per MWh: 1) has 
not been proposed or established in any other jurisdiction, 2) comes with 
significant administrative and design hurdles, and 3) is not necessarily 
more “technology neutral” than a portfolio standard.  
Based upon the analysis discussed in this report and the direction 
provided by MassCEC and the Agencies, Synapse focused its modeling 
analysis on the LSE portfolio standard design. As a helpful element of this 
exercise, the CES Policy Model allows for demonstration of the effect on 
emissions reductions and program costs of allowing particular resources—
nuclear, large scale hydro, natural gas, etc.—to be excluded from or 
included in an otherwise technology neutral LSE portfolio standard for 
Massachusetts. 
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Our analysis concludes 
that a CES designed as an 
LSE portfolio standard can 
be a viable, cost-effective 
option for Massachusetts 
as long as “windfall” CEC 
payments are not made to 
owners of resources that 
will not contribute to new 
greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our qualitative analysis also determined that REC and CEC prices would converge over time (see discussion in 
Section 5.5), due in part to the high demand for renewables stimulated by Massachusetts’ ambitious RPS. For 
this reason, the LSE portfolio standard represented in the CES Policy model maintains a close relationship 
between REC and CEC prices, and includes the assumption that LSEs’ purchase of RECs (as required by the 
existing Massachusetts RPS) may be used to partially satisfy CES requirements.  
The model’s Reference Case assumes that all CECP electricity-sector emission reduction strategies, except the 
Clean Energy Imports strategy and the Clean Energy Performance Standard, will be accomplished. The sole 
difference between the Reference and Policy Cases is the implementation of a CES. Model results depend both 
on the basic type of CES design chosen and on the details assumed regarding its implementation in the model. 
A different policy design choice or different implementation strategy might result in different costs or changes 
to other modeling results. So too would a different choice of emission reduction target: The policy targets 
explored in our analysis included GWSA electricity-sector target emissions levels (12,400 short tons (sT) in 
2020 and 8,400 sT in 2030), and emission reductions equal to 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 times the emission reductions 
expected from the Clean Energy Imports strategy in the CECP (5.5 million sT). 
CES Policy Model results also depend on user choices. The results presented here are based on modeling 
“runs” using varying assumptions regarding assigning CECs to particular types of resources, requiring municipal 
light plants (MLPs) to comply with a CES, the share of LSEs’ sales requiring CECs, the future growth of retail 
electricity sales, and emission reduction targets. All model runs shown here, however, use identical 
assumptions for all other modeling parameters including: 
 CES Implementation: Policy implementation is assessed for 2020 and 2030. 
 CES Design: The CES is modeled as an LSE portfolio standard. 
 CES Region: The CES is implemented in Massachusetts only. 
 CEC Threshold: CES credits are assigned to generators in proportion to a one ton per MWh 
threshold, as described below. 
2.2. Key Conclusions from Report Analysis 
Exploration of CES Policy Model results under various combinations of 
assumptions resulted in the following five findings, discussed below: (1) CES 
modeling is not viable for years later than 2030; (2) the share of sales 
requiring CECs determines the cost to ratepayers; (3) the CES does not 
reduce emissions if nuclear power is assigned CECs; (4) excluding MLPs from 
compliance raises costs; and (5) assigning CECs to natural gas raises costs.  
Overall, our analysis concludes that a CES designed as an LSE portfolio 
standard can be a viable, cost-effective option for Massachusetts as long as 
“windfall” CEC payments are not made to owners of resources, such as 
nuclear and natural gas, that will not (in the policy as modeled) contribute to 
new (additional) greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. A Clean Energy Standard for Massachusetts – Final Report 12  
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unprecedented planning 
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CES Modeling is Not Viable for Years Later than 2030 
Given current plant licenses, it seems likely that by 2050 there will be no nuclear generation facilities operating 
in New England.
4, 5
 The CES Reference case includes the assumption that New England will see 2,800 MW of 
nuclear retirements from 2031 to 2040, and another 1,200 MW of nuclear retirements from 2041 to 2050 (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Reference Case Generation Mix 
 
The loss of 22 percent of expected 2030 generation will be a massive, 
unprecedented planning challenge for New England. It is far more likely 
that the fuel mix of the resources necessary to replace nuclear generation 
will be determined by policy choices than by the dynamics of a potential 
future CES market. In the CES Policy Model, 2040 and 2050 results are 
swamped by the assumption that natural gas will replace exiting nuclear 
generation in the Reference Case. For this reason, we do not present Policy-
Case modeling results for 2040 and 2050 in this report. 
                                                          
4
 AESC 2013 makes the following assumptions regarding the retirement of New England’s nuclear units: Millstone 2, 2035; Millstone 3, 
2045; Pilgrim, 2032; Seabrook, 2030; and Vermont Yankee, 2032. The biennial New England Avoided Energy Supply Cost (AESC) study 
projects marginal energy supply costs that would be avoided due to reductions in electricity, natural gas, and other fuels resulting 
from energy efficiency programs offered to customers throughout New England. This collaborative report includes participants from 
energy efficiency program administrators, utilities, regulators, and consumer and environmental advocates. See Hornby R., P. 
Chernick, D. White, J. Rosenkranz, R. Denhardt, E. Stanton, J. Glifford, B. Grace, M. Chang, P. Luckow, T. Vitolo, P. Knight, B. Griffiths, 
and B. Biewald. July 2013. Avoided Energy Supply Costs in New England: 2013 Report. Prepared by Synapse Energy Economics for the 
2013 Avoided-Energy-Supply-Component (AESC) Study Group.  
5
 Indeed, on August 27, 2013 Entergy announce the 2014 retirement of Vermont Yankee, although this information was released too 
late to be included in the modeling described in this report. Entergy Press Release, August 27, 2013, “Entergy to Close, Decommission 
Vermont Yankee,” http://www.entergy.com/news_room/newsrelease.aspx?NR_ID=2769. 
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The Share of Sales Requiring CECs Determines the Cost to Ratepayers 
Customer utility bill increases due to CES are determined by the stringency of the requirement on LSEs—what 
share of load they must cover with CEC purchases, and whether or not MLPs are required to comply. The 
supply-side of the CES market—what resources are assigned how many credits, and what emission reductions 
are stimulated—has little impact on the price to consumers (with the exception of an alternative formulation 
of the CES policy discussed below). With the share of sales for which LSEs are required to hold CECs set to 100 
percent, residential customers’ bills rise with respect to the Reference Case by 9 percent in 2020 and 13 
percent in 2030—regardless of the emission reductions achieved (see Table 2). 
Table 2. CES Delta
6
 Bill Impacts: Share of Sales Requiring CECs = 100% 
 
As long as the share of sales for which LSEs are required to hold CECs is set to 100 percent, adjusting the CEC 
lbs/MWh threshold has only a small effect on emissions, and it is not possible to gradually introduce a CES 
policy in early years. Even with the CEC threshold set at its least stringent value (well above the emission rate 
of the most carbon-intensive resources in New England, e.g., at 3,000 lbs/MWh), with MLPs included and 
nuclear excluded (see below for more explanation of these assumptions), Massachusetts emissions fall by 12.0 
million sT in 2020 and 8.3 million in 2030. In comparison, with the share of sales requiring CECs set to 100 
percent and the CEC threshold set at its most stringent (at 1 lbs/MWh), 
Massachusetts emissions fall by 14.3 million sT in 2020 and 11.3 million in 
2030. The cost to ratepayers stays the same (as shown in Table 2) 
regardless of CEC threshold stringency. 
Instead, choosing a constant CEC threshold and varying the share of LSEs’ 
sales required to hold CECs allows for more flexibility in costs to rate 
payers and in the range of achievable emission reductions. (Of course, it 
would also be possible to vary both the CEC threshold and the share of 
LSEs’ sales required to hold CECs simultaneously. The number of possible 
combinations of assumptions is infinite, and we have not explored 
combined solutions in this report.) In the scenarios that follow we have set the CEC threshold to one sT of CO2 
per MWh (2,000 lbs/MWh), as shown in Table 3, with variations in the credits assigned to nuclear resources as 
described in the sub-sections below. 
                                                          
6
 “Delta” impacts are the results of the Policy Case less the results of the Reference Case. 
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The likely outcome of 
including nuclear 
generation in a CES would 
be windfall profits to 
nuclear facilities. 
Providing rewards to 
nuclear plants will not 
increase nuclear 
generation in New 
England . 
Table 3. CEC Threshold = One Ton CO2 per MWh (2,000 lbs/MWh) 
 
With MLPs included and nuclear excluded, the share of sales for which LSEs must hold CECs is 73 percent in 
2020 when the 5.5 million sT target emission reduction expected from the Clean Energy Imports strategy in the 
CECP is achieved; the increase to residential customers’ monthly bills grows by 6 percent with respect to the 
Reference Case in 2020. To achieve double this emission reduction (11.0 million sT), the share of sales for 
which LSEs must hold CECs must rise to 86 percent in 2020, while residential customers’ bills grow by 8 percent 
with respect to the Reference Case in 2020. Extrapolating to 2030 emission levels based on the CECP 2050 
Electrification Scenario, the Clean Energy Imports strategy in combination with other efforts require LSEs to 
hold CECs for 82 percent of sales in 2030, while the increase to residential customers’ monthly bills grows by 
10 percent with respect to the Reference Case.  
CES Does Not Reduce Emissions If Nuclear Power is Assigned CECs 
Assigning CES credit to existing nuclear generation adds 30,000 CECs to the Policy Case. Unless the CEC 
threshold is set low enough to exclude resources in addition to coal from receiving credits (at least as low as 
1,600 lbs/MWh in 2020 and 1,500 in 2030 with MLPs complying7) the CES 
market does not bind, even with the share of LSEs’ sales required to hold 
CECs set to 100 percent and MLPs required to comply. CES compliance can 
be satisfied with no change in dispatch or investment in new resources, 
and, therefore, no reduction in emissions (see Table 4). 
In the scenario shown in Table 4, New England emissions are the same in 
the Policy Case as in the Reference Case (i.e., “delta” emissions are zero). 
Massachusetts emissions are more than 7 million sT lower in the Policy 
Case due to shuffling: Massachusetts LSEs “take credit” for all of New 
England’s nuclear generation in this scenario; in the Reference Case, 
Massachusetts only takes credit for a small share of New England’s 
                                                          
7
 1,300 in 2020 and 1,200 in 2030 without MLPs. 
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nuclear generation. 
Table 4. CES Delta Results: Includes Nuclear and MLPs; Threshold = 1,700 lbs/MWh; Share of Sales = 100% 
 
Even though no actual emission reduction is stimulated in this scenario, residential customers see their utility 
bills grow by 9 percent in 2020 and 13 percent in 2030 with respect to the Reference Case. The likely outcome 
of including nuclear generation in a CES would be windfall profits to nuclear facilities. Providing rewards for 
nuclear generation will not prompt the construction of new nuclear facilities in New England (due to 
regulatory, cost, and political hurdles), although it may serve to prolong the life of existing facilities. The 
remaining scenarios shown in this report assume that existing nuclear generation will not be assigned CES 
credit. 
Excluding MLPs from Compliance Raises Costs 
Costs and emission reductions depend, in part, on whether or not MLPs are required to comply with the CES. 
With MLPs required to comply, in order to achieve the 5.5 million sT target emission reduction (with nuclear 
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If MLPs are excluded from 
compliance, the cost to 
ratepayers would be 
higher to achieve the 
same emission reduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resources excluded from receiving CES credit and the CEC threshold set to 2,000 lbs/MWh), LSEs must hold 
CECs equal to 73 percent of sales in 2020 and 82 percent in 2030. The cost to residential customers would 
grow by 6 percent with respect to the Reference Case in 2020 and 10 percent 
in 2030, as shown in Table 5. 
If MLPs are excluded from compliance, the cost to ratepayers would be higher 
to achieve the same emission reduction. The share of non-MLP sales requiring 
CECs would be 85 percent in 2020 and 95 percent in 2030, and residential 
rates would grow by 7 percent in 2020 and 11 percent in 2030 with respect to 
the Reference Case (see Table 6). 
Table 5. CES Delta Bill Impacts: Excludes Nuclear and Includes MLPs; Threshold = 2,000 lbs/MWh 
 
Table 6. CES Delta Bill Impacts: Excludes Nuclear and MLPs; Threshold = 2,000 lbs/MWh 
 
It is also the case that with MLPs excluded from compliance, higher levels of emission reductions (for example, 
a 11.0 million sT reduction) are simply not achievable using the CES unless both the share of sales for which 
LSEs are required to hold CECs and the CEC threshold are used as levers. The remaining scenarios shown in this 
report assume that MLPs will comply with CES.  
Assigning CECs to Natural Gas Raises Costs 
To achieve a 5.5 million sT target emission reduction (with nuclear excluded, MLPs required to comply, and the 
CEC threshold set to 2,000 lbs/MWh), LSEs must be required to hold CECs for 73 percent of their sales in 2020 
and 82 percent in 2030. In this scenario (shown in detail in Table 7) residential customers’ monthly utility bills 
rise by 6 percent with respect to the Reference Case in 2020 and 10 percent in 2030. 
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Table 7. CES Delta Results: Excludes Nuclear and Includes MLPs; Threshold = 2,000 lbs/MWh 
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Excluding resources with 
emission rates greater 
than the 2015 
Massachusetts average 
emission rate lowers both 
the share of sales 
requiring CECs and costs 
to ratepayers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because the 2015 Massachusetts average emission rate (660 lbs/MWh) is lower than the average of the 
combined-cycle plants that represent that vast majority of natural gas resources in New England (1,080 
lbs/MWh), the CES cannot achieve emission reductions by stimulating more dispatch of or new investment in 
natural gas resources. (In the column graph at the bottom of Table 7 above, natural gas generation—shown in 
orange—declines while zero-carbon generation other than nuclear grows.) In all CES policy scenarios, demand 
for CECs displaces natural gas and stimulates investment in new zero-carbon generation resources, including 
additional imports from Canada. (This simplifying assumption is discussed more fully in Section 5.5.) CEC prices 
paid to natural gas generators, therefore, are a windfall: these resources owners would receive payments 
without changing dispatch or investing in new resources. 
Excluding resources with emission rates greater than the 2015 
Massachusetts average from receiving CECs would have dramatic results; 
the effect of this exclusion, of course, is to preclude natural gas 
generators from receiving CECs. With the same assumptions as shown 
above in Table 7—nuclear excluded and MLPs required to comply—the 
additional exclusion of resources with emission rates greater than 660 
lbs/MWh lowers both the share of sales requiring CECs and costs to 
ratepayers (see Table 8 below). 
In this scenario, with natural gas resources excluded from receiving CES credit, the share of sales for which 
LSEs are required to hold CECs falls to 29 percent in 2020 and 39 percent in 2030. Residential customers’ utility 
bills increase by just 2 percent with respect to the Reference Case in both 2020 and 2030, in comparison to 6 
and 10 percent, respectively, with natural gas participating in the CES. Natural gas is still displaced, and 
emissions still fall by 5.5 million sT, but no CES payments are made to the natural gas plants that continue to 
operate. 
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Table 8. CES Delta Results: With 660 lbs/MWh Cap on Resources Receiving CECs 
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3. CLEAN ENERGY STANDARDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Synapse’s investigation of CES options for Massachusetts began with a review of similar policies in both North 
America and Europe. A Clean Energy Standard regulates the emission of greenhouse gases from the electricity 
sector. Our review of CES policies revealed a wide variety of possible regulatory mechanisms including 
lbs/MWh standards, share of retail sales standards, and restrictions on electricity sector contracts. 
Two countries and six U.S. states have enacted CES policies with the goal of reducing or slowing the growth of 
CO2 emissions from the electric power sector (see Table 9). Some of these standards apply to generators, and 
others apply to LSEs. The standards applied to generators typically require new or expanding plants to meet a 
CO2 emission-rate performance standard, while the standards applied to LSEs typically prevent these 
companies from investing in, or signing long-term contracts with, plants that do not meet a CO2 standard. Two 
CES policies proposed at the federal level in the United States take a different approach. These “portfolio” 
standards would require LSEs to cover a portion of their electricity sales portfolio with credits from specific 
types of power plants, deemed in the proposals to be “clean.” 
Table 9. Design of Clean Energy Standards in Other Jurisdictions 
 
Section 3 of this report examines and compares the designs of these existing and proposed CES policies. 
Specifically, this section looks at: 
 Several proposed federal clean energy standards, including President Obama’s Clean Energy 
Standard Proposal, Senator Bingaman’s proposed Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012, and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) New Source Performance Standards;  
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 Some of the best known and most established CES measures, and the interactions of these 
standards with emissions trading programs, including those in California and the United 
Kingdom; and 
 Several, perhaps less familiar, proposed and existing CES measures, including those in Canada, 
New York, Washington State, Oregon, Montana, and Illinois. 
3.1. Proposed Federal Performance Measures 
President Obama’s Clean Energy Standard Proposal 
President Obama, in his 2011 State of the Union address, committed to adopting a federal Clean Energy 
Standard that would double the share of U.S. electricity generated from “clean” energy sources to 80 percent 
by 2035. The President’s vision for a CES would support generation from a wide variety of energy sources the 
White House has deemed clean, including renewable energy sources (defined as wind, solar, biomass, and 
hydropower); nuclear power; efficient natural gas; and coal with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).
8
 
According to a report released by the White House in February 2011, the President’s proposed CES would be 
founded on five core principles: (1) double the share of clean electricity in 25 years; (2) provide credits for a 
broad range of clean energy sources; (3) protect consumers against rising energy bills; (4) ensure fairness 
among regions; and (5) promote new technologies such as “clean coal.”9 Like the more fully developed 
Bingaman bill discussed below, the President’s proposal envisions creating new clean energy credits for certain 
technologies, and requiring LSEs to cover a portion of their sales with these credits. The President’s proposal 
would give full credits to renewable and nuclear power, and partial credits for “clean coal” and “efficient” 
natural gas plants. These terms are not yet defined, but may include coal facilities with CCS or coal facilities 
that sell the CO2 for use in advanced oil recovery. 
Senator Bingaman’s Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 
In response to President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union address, in March 2011, Senator Jeff Bingaman, the 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and Senator Lisa Murkowski, Ranking 
Member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, issued a white paper on a Clean Energy 
Standard. The white paper states that its purpose is to “lay out some of the key questions and potential design 
elements of a CES, in order to solicit input from a broad range of interested parties, to facilitate discussion, and 
to ascertain whether or not consensus can be achieved.”10 
                                                          
8 See “Innovate Our Way to a Clean Energy Future,” available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securing-american-energy.  
9 See “A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing Our Economic Growth and Prosperity,” Appendix C, February 2011, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/InnovationStrategy.pdf.  
10
 Sens. Jeff Bingaman and Lisa Murkowski, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Untied States Senate, “White Paper on a 
Clean Energy Standard,” March 21, 2011. Available at: 
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d9286e01-b2ea-0c97-971a-6b9d16ef32ef. 
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In 2012, drawing on the white paper’s findings, Senator Bingaman introduced legislation that would set a 
national clean energy requirement of 24 percent of total electricity generation in 2015, rising by 3 percentage 
points per year to 84 percent in 2035.11 The proposed Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (Bingaman Bill) is a 
portfolio standard that would require LSEs to hold clean energy credits for a certain percentage of their retail 
electricity sales. Generators designated as “clean” are renewables, qualified renewable biomass, hydropower, 
nuclear, natural gas, and qualified waste-to-energy facilities that were brought into service after 1991. New 
projects that employ qualified combined heat and power (CHP), have an annual carbon intensity of less than 
1,640 lbs/MWh, or capture and permanently store carbon emissions are also considered “clean” under the 
Bingaman Bill.12 
Resources would qualify for credits based on their carbon emissions profile compared to that of an efficient 
coal plant (set at 1,640 lbs/MWh of CO2). Emissions (and therefore, credits) would be calculated on an 
individual power plant basis, rather than being set by category of technology, in order to encourage efficiency 
across all technologies. Resources with no CO2 emissions would receive a full credit, while generators with CO2 
emissions rates above zero but less than 1,640 lbs/MWh of generation, such as combined-cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) units or coal with CCS, would receive a partial credit. Plants with emissions at or above 1,640 lbs/MWh 
would receive no credit (see Table 10). The bill requires the Department of Energy to establish a federal clean 
energy credit trading program under which electric utilities submit clean energy credits to certify compliance 
with the clean energy requirement. Credits would be calculated based on a resource’s annual sales and its 
annual average carbon intensity compared to the 1,640 lbs/MWh benchmark. 
Table 10. Bingaman Bill Portfolio Standard Illustration 
 
The proposed legislation would allow credits to be banked for use in future years, and starting in 2015 utilities 
would have the option of paying an alternative compliance payment (ACP) of $30/MWh (rising by 5 percent 
per year thereafter) in lieu of purchasing clean energy credits. The ACP payments would fund the State Energy 
                                                          
11
 S. 2146, Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012. See also, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Clean Energy Standards,” accessed 
on April 16, 2012, available at: http://www.c2es.org/federal/policy-solutions/clean-energy-standards.  
12
“Qualified CHP” is defined as: a system that uses the same source of energy to produce both electricity and thermal energy, produces 
at least 20 percent of the useful energy as electricity and 20 percent as thermal energy, uses only qualified renewable biomass (if 
biomass is used), and operates at an energy efficiency of at least 50 percent. See Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 at Section 
610(b)(3). “Qualified Renewable Biomass” is biomass produced and harvested through land management practices that maintain or 
restore the composition, structure, and process of ecosystems, including the diversity of plant and animal communities, water 
quality, and the productive capacity of soil and ecological systems. See Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 at Section 610(b)(5). 
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Efficiency Funding Program, to be established not later than December 31, 2015, which would provide money 
to states for the implementation of state energy efficiency plans.
13
 
Small utilities would be exempt from any compliance obligation.14 Electricity sold from existing nuclear and 
hydropower facilities in service before 1992—nearly all U.S. plants of these types15—may be deducted from a 
utility’s overall sales amount before calculating the percentage of clean energy needed for that year.
16
 
Senator Bingaman requested that the Energy Information Administration (EIA) analyze the Bingaman Bill. The 
results of that analysis are summarized below. 
 The Bingaman Bill would alter the projected generation mix as follows: 
o Coal-fired generation would decrease 25 percent with respect to the reference case 
level in 2025 and 54 percent in 2035; 
o Natural gas-fired generation would increase 13 percent with respect to the reference 
case in 2020 and 10 percent in 2035; 
o Nuclear generation would increase 16 percent with respect to the reference case in 
2025 and to 62 percent in 2035; and 
o Non-hydroelectric renewable generation would increase 42 percent with respect to 
the reference case in 2025 and 34 percent in 2035, with wind and biomass exhibiting 
the largest increases. 
 Annual electricity sector CO2 emissions would decrease 20 percent with respect to the 
reference case in 2025 and 44 percent in 2035. 
 Average electricity prices would not experience a significant impact until after 2020, as 
compliance with the Bingaman Bill switches from using natural gas and biomass at existing 
facilities to investment in new combined cycle, renewable, and nuclear capacity. Because 
electricity retailers with sales under a given level are exempt from the Bingaman Bill, average 
price impacts do not capture what may be a considerable divergence in the price impacts on 
customers of exempt and non-exempt electricity providers.17 
                                                          
13
  S. 2146, Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 at Section 610(j). 
14
  Small utilities are less than 2 million MWh of sales per year in 2015, falling by 100,000 MWh per year to 1 million MWh of sales per 
year in 2025. S. 2146, Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 at Section 610(c). 
15
  Only two out of 104 nuclear plants came online after 1992. See EIA, “Nuclear & Uranium,” accessed on April 22, 2013, available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/nuclear/reactors/stats_table3.html. Of the nearly 1 GW of hydro power in the United States, about 97 percent 
have an in-service date prior to 1992. See, EIA, Form 860, Schedule 3, Generator, 2011, available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/. 
16
  S. 2146, Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 at Section 610(c). 
17
 EIA, “Analysis of the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012,” May 2012, http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/bces12/pdf/cesbing.pdf 
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Resources for the Future
18
 conducted an analysis of the Bingaman Bill, modeling how the policy might affect 
the electric sector under different assumptions about gas prices and anticipated environmental regulations. 
The key findings from that analysis are summarized below. 
 The Bingaman Bill would reduce nationwide CO2 emissions substantially—by 1.1 billion metric 
tons, or 41 percent of emissions with respect to the reference case, in 2035. For comparison, 
the United States emitted approximately 2.4 billion tons of CO2 in 2009, of which New 
England’s share was approximately 44 million tons.
19
 
 Because of the ACP and the exemption for small utilities, the Bingaman Bill will not meet its 
goal of 84 percent clean energy by 2035. 
 The Bingaman Bill would raise national average retail electric prices by about 18 percent by 
2035. 
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) reviewed the Bingaman Bill and, while applauding it for setting 
aggressive targets, identified three major shortcomings to be addressed before the bill becomes law. First, UCS 
argued that mature technologies, especially natural gas-fired generation, do not need additional clean energy 
incentives, especially in light of concerns around hydraulic fracturing and fugitive methane emissions. Second, 
giving incentives to older technologies undermines the goal of a CES: to stimulate investments in new 
technologies and bring additional facilities online. Finally, energy efficiency should be integrated into the 
Bingaman Bill’s provisions and, if not, then the legislation should include a stand-alone energy efficiency 
resource standard.20 
Applied to Massachusetts, the Bingaman proposal would require compliance by National Grid and Northeast 
Utilities. All MLPs would be exempt as small utilities. Low emission sources already comprise a large share of 
the New England power generation mix. Assuming partial credits for gas and oil, and full credits for renewables 
and nuclear, the Commonwealth’s “clean energy share” would be about 68 percent in 2012, far exceeding the 
2015 target of 24 percent in the proposed bill.21 This suggests that at least in the early years, the Bingaman Bill 
would not provide an incentive to Massachusetts generators to additionally reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
The proposed bill has not been reintroduced to the 113th Congress. It remains on the table as one possible 
energy policy mechanism, but no decisions have been made as to the bill’s timeline or pathway forward.22 
                                                          
18
  “Analysis of the Bingaman Clean Energy Standard Proposal,” available at: http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Pages/Analysis-of-the-
Bingaman-Clean-Energy-Standard-Proposal.aspx. 
19
  EPA, eGRID2012 Version 1.0, “Year 2009 Summary Tables,” April 2012, table “Year 2009 eGRID Subregion Emissions – Greenhouse 
Gases.” 
20
 Union of Concerned Scientists, “Improvements Needed on National Clean Energy Standard,” May 16, 2012, available at: 
http://blog.ucsusa.org/improvements-needed-on-national-clean-energy-standard. 
21
 Author’s calculations based on ISONE – Energy Sources in New England, http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/enrgy_srcs/.   
22
 Personal communications with Kevin Rennert, Staff Member, State Energy and Environmental Resource Committee, April 18, 2013. 
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EPA Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gases from Electric Utility Generating 
Units 
In April 2012, under court order, the EPA proposed a draft New Source Performance Standard for greenhouse 
gases from new fossil-fuel electric utility generating units. The proposed requirements, which are limited to 
newly constructed sources and those undertaking major modifications,
23
 would require fossil fuel-fired units 
greater than 25 MW to meet an output-based CO2 standard of 1,000 lbs/MWh, based on the performance of 
widely available CCGT technology. The draft regulation includes provisions allowing new coal units to average 
their emissions over 30 years of operation. This means a new coal unit could delay installation of CCS for the 
first 10 years of its life as long as it installed CCS with 90 percent capture, which would substantially exceed the 
regulatory standard for the next 20 years. By the eleventh year of operation, the facility would be required to 
meet a CO2 emissions level of 600 lbs/MWh on a 12-month annual average basis for the remaining 20 years. As 
part of the proposal, the EPA sought comment on this compliance option, and in particular on a mechanism for 
establishing enforceable short-term limits during the 30-year period.24 The EPA is in the process of finalizing 
the standard.25 
Once these performance standards for new units are finalized, the Clean Air Act also requires EPA to establish 
a minimum threshold for states to use in the development of emission performance standards for greenhouse 
gases from existing power plants. Each state will have to submit a plan to EPA (similar to a State 
Implementation Plan for criteria air pollutants) that lays out how the performance standards for existing 
sources will be implemented.26 The promulgation of performance standards for existing power plants is a 
highly contentious subject. In a June 25, 2013 memorandum,27 President Obama, as part of his Climate Action 
Plan, directed EPA to propose standards for existing plants by June 1, 2014 and finalize them by June 1, 2015. 
3.2. CESs in Other Jurisdictions 
California 
In 2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued an Executive Order calling for a reduction in 
California’s emission of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 2020. In September 2006, California adopted 
Senate Bill 1368, called the Emission Performance Standards (EPS).28 The legislature determined that “in order 
to have any meaningful impact on climate change, the Governor’s goals for reducing emissions of greenhouse 
                                                          
23
  As of April 13, 2012. 
24 EPA, Proposed Rule Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units, April 13, 2012, I.B.5.a.ii, III.B.2; available at: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-0001.  
25 See http://www.epa.gov/airquality/cps/settlement.html.  
26 42 U.S.C. §7411(d). 
27
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards 
28
 Perata, Chapter 598, California Statutes of 2006. 
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gases must be applied to the state’s electricity consumption, not just the state’s electricity production.”
29
 The 
law requires the California Energy Commission and the California Public Utilities Commission (CA PUC) to adopt 
regulations that establish an emission performance standard for greenhouse gases for all baseload generation 
(defined as a 60 percent or higher capacity factor) of local, publicly owned electric utilities and load-serving 
entities “at a rate of emissions of greenhouse gases that is no higher than the rate of emissions of greenhouse 
gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation."
30
 
The California Energy Commission established regulations that preclude LSEs and publicly owned utilities from 
investing in or signing long-term contracts with baseload plants with CO2 rates in excess of 1,100 lbs/MWh.
31 
While the standard applies to all baseload generation facilities, public utilities are only required to report 
procurements involving baseload generation of 10 MW or greater. The standard is limited to CO2 emissions 
because, according to the statute: “[T]his pollutant makes up the overwhelming majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions and is the most reliable and efficient measure of greenhouse gas performance.”32 The regulations 
do not allow averaging emissions across commonly owned units; rather, each baseload generator must comply 
with the standard on its own. 
The 1,100 lbs/MWh standard was established after evaluation of the performance of existing CCGT baseload 
power plants in the West, with special consideration given to existing California plants. This relatively high 
(weak) lbs/MWh standard (reflecting the performance capabilities of older, existing CCGTs as opposed to new 
CCGTs) was established because, as the Energy Commission explained, it did not want to disadvantage new, 
clean units locating in adverse conditions such as high altitude or hot temperatures. The law also allowed for 
all CCGTs that were in operation or had a final permit to operate as of June 30, 2007 to be deemed in 
compliance. Any generating units added to these existing “deemed compliant” plants are required to meet the 
standards if the combined units increase the plant’s generating capacity by 50 MW or more.33 Because the 
standard applies to utilities’ investments in and LSEs’ procurements of baseload generation, it does not matter 
whether that generation is located in state or out of state. 
The CA PUC established procedures for determining and verifying the emissions of CO2 from baseload 
generation subject to the emissions performance standard. California’s procedure for determining generators’ 
emissions is based on capacity factors, heat rates, and corresponding emissions rates that reflect the expected 
operations of power plants and not their full load heat rates.34 Within ten business days after entering into a 
contract, local publicly owned electric utilities must submit a compliance filing to the CA PUC that provides 
                                                          
29
 Id. at Sec. 8340(k). 
30
 Id. at Sec. 8341(d)(1) and 8341(e)(1). In California, the Energy Commission is responsible for certifying renewable resources, verifying 
compliance with RPS requirements, and controlling greenhouse gases. The CA PUC regulates public utilities and is required to review 
and approve a procurement plan and a renewable energy procurement plan for each of the state’s public utilities. 
31
 Long-term is defined as greater than 5 years. 
32
 Id. at 3. 
33
 20 CCR 11 §2901(e). 
34
 20 CCR 11 § 2903(a). 
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documentation of the contract, including whether the contract is new or renewed, is with a generation source 
that uses CCS, and whether the contract is based on unspecified energy purchases (see below for more 
information on unspecified energy purchases). The CA PUC then reviews the compliance filing for 
completeness and compliance with the regulations.
35
 
The California EPS is currently being evaluated in response to environmental organizations’ concerns that 
investments in non-EPS compliant facilities are not being reviewed by the Energy Commission and that 
California’s utilities may be continuing to make substantial investments in existing coal plants.36 The groups 
have requested that California’s Energy Commission amend the implementing regulations to require review of 
all procurements made by the utilities. At the same time, the utilities have requested a full re-evaluation of the 
CA PUC’s and the Energy Commission’s regulations implementing the EPS, as required by Public Utilities Code 
§8341(f).37 To our knowledge, data regarding actual greenhouse gas emission reductions from the California 
EPS are not yet available. 
In addition, Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32) requires the California Air Resources Board (ARB) to develop a Scoping 
Plan that describes the approach California will take to achieve the goal of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020.38 The Scoping Plan—first approved in 2008, and scheduled for updating in 2013—recommended that 
the state expand its energy efficiency and RPS programs, develop a cap-and-trade program, establish targets 
for transportation-related greenhouse gases emissions, and implement other policies intended to reduce 
statewide greenhouse gas emissions.
39
 
In response to AB 32 and the Scoping Plan, in 2011 the ARB adopted a cap-and-trade regulation that sets a 
statewide limit on sources responsible for 85 percent of California’s greenhouse gas emissions. The major 
emission sources that the cap-and-trade program covers are refineries, power plants, industrial facilities, and 
transportation fuels. The emission cap is set in 2013, at about 2 percent below emissions forecasted for 2012, 
and declines 2 percent in 2014 and 3 percent annually from 2015 through 2020.40 
                                                          
35
 20 CCR 11 §§ 2909, 2910. 
36
 See “Joint Petition of the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club for Initiation of a Rulemaking Regarding California’s 
Emissions Performance Standard,” November 14, 2011, available at : 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/emission_standards/2012rulemaking/documents/joint-petiton/2011-11-14_SB1368_Petition.pdf.  
37 See California Energy Commission “Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Modification of Regulations Establishing a Greenhouse 
Gases Emissions Performance Standard for Baseload Generation of Local Publicly Owned Electric Utilities,” Order 12-0112-7, January 
12, 2012. 
38
 For more information, see California Air Resource Board, “Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act,” accessed on April 18, 
2013, available at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm. The Scoping Plan was first approved by the ARB in 2008 and will be 
updated in 2013 to evaluate the mix of AB 32 policies to ensure that California is on track to achieving the 2020 greenhouse gas 
reduction goal. For more information, see California Air Resource Board, “AB 32 Scoping Plan,” accessed on April 18, 2013, available 
at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htm 
39
 ARB, Climate Change Scoping Plan, December 2008, ES-3. 
40
 ARB, “Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program,” October 20, 2011. 
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Several of the measures recommended in the Scoping Plan are intentionally designed to complement one 
another. For example, the cap-and-trade program creates an emissions cap on the sectors responsible for the 
vast majority of California’s greenhouse gas emissions and provides the capped sources significant flexibility in 
how they collectively achieve the reductions necessary to meet the cap.
41
 California’s cap-and-trade regulation 
is projected to account for less than 20 percent of the total emissions reductions required under the Scoping 
Plan. The cap under ARB’s rule is flexible and can be tightened if ARB’s other emission reduction measures are 
less effective than anticipated. Should the other Scoping Plan measures covering capped sectors 
underperform, the cap is the backstop to ensure California will comply with AB 32.
42
 
While the Scoping Plan acknowledges that the EPS is part of California’s climate change policy, it does not 
identify the EPS as a specific emissions reduction measure that the capped sectors can use to complement the 
cap-and-trade program. California’s cap-and-trade program, however, recognizes the EPS through its 
regulations on leakage and resource shuffling.43 The cap-and-trade program attempts to regulate leakage by 
placing compliance obligations on electricity imported into the state as well as electricity generated in the 
state, although these regulations were put on abeyance by the California Air Resources Board at the request of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commissions (FERC) in August 2012.44 
California uses the First Jurisdictional Deliverer approach to regulate imports, which assigns responsibility for 
emissions arising from imported electricity to those entities that first import power into the regulated region. 
To monitor and track emissions from imported electricity, California created a distinction between specified 
and unspecified transactions of electricity. Specified transactions are agreements between out-of-state 
generators and in-state LSEs where the generating plant is known, and it is therefore relatively easier to assign 
emissions to the electricity being imported. Unspecified transactions refer to imported electricity where it is 
unclear specifically where the power originated. California makes certain modeling assumptions about 
generation and related emissions in neighboring power systems and develops a “default emissions rate” that it 
attributes to unspecified load. Under California’s default assumptions, all unspecified imports are assigned a 
regional default emission factor of 1,100 lbs of CO2/MWh produced, regardless of the geographic region from 
which the electricity is imported.
45
 
                                                          
41
 ARB, Climate Change Scoping Plan, December 2008, 28. 
42
 Natural Resources Defense Council, “10 Questions about California’s Cap and Trade Program,” accessed on April 18, 2013, available 
at: http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/10_questions_about_californias.html; C2ES, “California Cap and Trade,” accessed on 
April 18, 2013, available at: http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade#Overall. 
43
 Leakage is defined in California as a reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases within the state that is offset by an increase in 
emissions of greenhouse gases outside the state. California Health and Safety Code § 38505. Resource Shuffling is a form of leakage 
that could occur in the electricity sector. Resource shuffling is defined in California as any plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit 
based on emissions reductions that have not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California grid. 17 CCR 11 § 
95802(a)(250). See ARB, “Cap-and-Trade Regulation Instructional Guidance,” Appendix A, November 2012, available at: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/appendix_a.pdf 
44
 Letter to Governor Brown from FERC Commissioner Moeller, August 6, 2012, http://www.ferc.gov/about/com-
mem/moeller/moeller-08-06-12.pdf 
45
 Columbia Law School, “Legal Issues in Regulating Imports in State and Regional Cap and Trade Programs,” October 2012, 10-13. 
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The ARB specifically identifies resource shuffling as replacing relatively lower emission electricity with 
electricity generated at a high-emission, out-of-state power plant procured by an LSE under a long-term 
contract or ownership arrangement, when the power plant does not meet California’s EPS, and the 
substitution is made in order to reduce an LSE’s compliance obligation under the cap-and-trade program. 
Similarly, ARB specifies that resource shuffling also occurs if an LSE assigns such a long-term contract for high-
emission electricity to a third party for the purpose of reducing a compliance obligation under the cap-and-
trade program.
46
 
California’s import regulations have not yet faced a legal challenge, but many anticipate that as the program 
moves from planning to implementation, challenges will develop. The two legal issues that are generally 
thought to be the most likely arguments raised against import regulations are whether they violate the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and whether such regulations are preempted by the Federal Power Act. 
The Commerce Clause has been interpreted as limiting states’ ability to impose burdens on interstate 
commerce. According to a Columbia Law School report, any legal challenges made by aggrieved parties based 
on the Commerce Clause would likely prove unsuccessful in court. A court would probably not find import 
regulations unconstitutional because resource shuffling regulations (via application of a system-based 
emissions factor and limitations on specified contracts) would not involve any transactions occurring entirely 
out-of-state. The Columbia Law School report likewise states that a court would find that these regulations do 
not discriminate against out-of-state commerce, as they impose a cost on First Jurisdictional Deliverers or LSEs 
who import electricity that is comparable to the cost already imposed on in-state generators subject to the cap 
and trade system.
47
 
Regarding Federal Power Act legal concerns, the doctrine of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause 
of the Constitution, which makes federal law the supreme law of the land and thus implies that state laws that 
contradict federal law cannot stand. The Columbia Law School report also finds that import regulations would 
likely withstand an Federal Power Act preemption challenge, because there is not a strong argument to be 
made that import regulations interfere with FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmission or the wholesale 
electricity market in such a way that the preemption doctrine could apply. 
United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom has also committed to decarbonization of its economy and has established a goal of 
reducing the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions to 80 percent of its 1990 levels by 2050.48 The two-
party Coalition’s Programme for Government made a policy commitment to establish a standard that would 
“prevent coal-fired power stations from being built unless they are equipped with sufficient carbon capture 
                                                          
46
 ARB, “Cap-and-Trade Regulation Instructional Guidance,” Appendix A, November 2012, available at: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/appendix_a.pdf. 
47
 Columbia Law School, “Legal Issues in Regulating Imports in State and Regional Cap and Trade Programs,” October 2012, 9, 17-18, 
23-25. 
48
 See Climate Change Act 2008, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents.  
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and storage to meet the emissions performance standard.”
49
 In May 2012, the Programme introduced the 
draft Energy Bill 2012-13, which sets a statutory limit on the amount of annual CO2 emissions permitted from 
new fossil fuel generators. At present, the Carbon Dioxide Emissions Performance Standard (UK EPS) is 
proposed at 450 kg/MWh, or 992 lbs/MWh, and would be used to calculate the per unit annual CO2 emission 
limit for plants operating at baseload (defined as an 85 percent or higher capacity factor).50 This same annual 
limit is expected to be “grandfathered” for each new plant until 2045. The locking-in of the standard for the 
economic life of the plant was determined to be necessary in order to provide certainty for developers and 
investors planning new projects.
51
 
The proposed UK EPS level was determined based on the average emissions intensity of the country’s power 
plants in 2010. It would apply to all fossil-fuel fired power plants that are larger than 50 MW, including new 
plants and existing plants that undergo significant life extensions (though not including CCS retrofits, projects 
installed in compliance with European environmental standards,
52
 or projects that help increase the use of 
biomass) starting in 2014. The law exempts coal plants that are part of the United Kingdom’s CCS 
Commercialisation Programme and those that benefit from European Union funding for commercial-scale CCS 
demonstration. 
The regulations implementing the proposed UK EPS have not yet been worked out and are expected to be 
established with secondary legislation. New monitoring and enforcement regulations are expected to utilize 
the emissions reporting requirements from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) to help 
determine compliance with the EPS. Of particular interest will be how the government will handle the 
timeframe for the grandfathering provision, and how the UK EPS will be constructed so as not to disadvantage 
CHP projects, which are seen as pivotal for helping to meet the electric industry’s decarbonization goals, since 
CHP would displace the need for carbon-producing heat generation, particularly in the industrial sector.
53
  
While the Draft Energy Bill containing the EPS has not yet been finalized, at the end of January 2013 a member 
of the United Kingdom’s Labour Party introduced an amendment to the bill that would drastically reduce 
(make more stringent) the proposed EPS from 450 kg/MWh to 200 kg/MWh beginning in 2020. The 
                                                          
49 See Energy Bill 2012 summary from Department of Energy and Climate Change: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/68778/Energy_Bill_-
_Emissions_Performance_Standard.pdf.  
50
 See “EPS Impact Assessment, Part 2,” available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48137/2179-eps-impact-assessment-emr-wp.pdf.  
51 Id. 
52
  Specifically, upgrades required to meet the Integrated Emissions Directive, which related to minimizing pollution from various 
industrial sources throughout the European Union. European Commission, “The Industrial Emission Directive,” accessed on April 22, 
2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pollutants/stationary/ied/legislation.htm. See “EPS Impact Assessment, 
Part 1,” p 12, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66042/7061-emissions-
performance-standard-impact-assessments.pdf. 
53 
See “Electricity Market Reform: Update on the Emissions Performance Standard,” available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48375/5350-emr-annex-d--update-on-the-
emissions-performance-s.pdf. 
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amendment also would shorten the proposed grandfathering period from ending in 2045 to ending in 2029.
54
 
Though unlikely to gain support, this amendment would have the effect of requiring CCS for both coal and gas 
plants beginning in 2020. 
If an EPS is passed in the UK, it is uncertain how it would interact with the EU ETS.
55
 A UK EPS would overlap 
with the EU ETS because the power sector is a capped industry within the EU ETS. While a UK EPS could result 
in the UK power sector reducing its carbon emissions at a faster rate than would otherwise occur under the EU 
ETS, any increased emission abatement in the UK from an EPS potentially could be offset by less abatement by 
other countries participating in the EU ETS. Therefore, a UK EPS would not necessarily lead to any overall 
emissions reductions at the global level. The UK EPS could also drive down the price of EU ETS allowances 
because more allowances would be made available through UK abatement efforts, and a lower allowance price 
could reduce the economic incentive for investment in abatement efforts elsewhere in Europe.
56
  
In the long run, the EU ETS cap could be tightened to account for the UK EPS, which would then likely bring 
about actual emissions reductions. In 2010, the UK House of Commons made similar conclusions, stating that 
“it would not be sensible to introduce an EPS if its sole aim is to drive immediate emissions reductions from 
the power sector since the EU ETS already exists to do this. However, we also note that the EU ETS cap needs 
to be significantly tighter than its current and planned future level if it is to be effective in achieving 
reductions.”57 Legal considerations would need to be investigated as to whether such an action could be 
implemented by the EU ETS participating countries. A report from University College London notes, however, 
that a UK EPS could drive technological innovation in emissions abatement, which is likely to encourage a 
tightening of overall caps for the EU ETS in the long-term.58 
Another study found that the least-cost way to reduce power-related carbon emissions in Europe would be to 
supplement the EU ETS with emission performance standards for energy. Emission performance standards can 
quicken the pace of investment in abatement technology if the EU ETS cannot deliver the correct price signals 
                                                          
54 
See “Gardiner Amendments to Energy Bill,” January 29, 2013, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0100/amend/pbc1002901m.pdf. 
55
 The EU ETS covers more than 11,000 power stations and industrial plans in 31 countries, as well as airlines. The EU ETS covers 
emissions of CO2 from power plants, a wide range of energy-intensive industry sectors and commercial airlines. Nitrous oxide 
emissions from the production of certain acids and emissions of perfluorocarbons from aluminum production are also included. In 
total, about 45 percent of total European greenhouse gas emissions are limited by the EU ETS. Annually, a company must surrender 
enough allowances to cover all its emissions, otherwise heavy fines are imposed. If a company reduces its emissions, it can keep the 
spare allowances to cover its future needs or else sell them to another company that is short of allowances. European Commission, 
“The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),” accessed April 22, 2013, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. 
56
 UK Parliament, “The Role for an Emissions Performance Standard,” prepared December 2, 2010, accessed April 22, 2013, available 
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/523/52306.htm. See also, University College London, 
“CO2 Emission Performance Standards: A Submission to the UK Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change,” October 2010, 
available at: http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/law-environment/files/2012/12/Think-piece-3-Macrory.pdf. 
57
 UK Parliament, “The Role for an Emissions Performance Standard,” prepared December 2, 2010, accessed April 22, 2013, available 
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/523/52306.htm 
58
 University College London, “CO2 Emission Performance Standards: A Submission to the UK Select Committee on Energy and Climate 
Change,” October 2010, available at: http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/law-environment/files/2012/12/Think-piece-3-Macrory.pdf. 
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on the schedule required by policy-makers, or provide the consistency required by industry for long-term, 
large-scale investment.
59
 
Canada 
Canada has a greenhouse gas reduction goal of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. In September 2012, 
Canada finalized a national environmental performance standard for coal. The law requires new coal-fired 
units that start operation after June 30, 2015, and existing coal-fired units that are 50 years old or older,
60
 to 
meet a CO2 emission performance standard of 420 kg/MWh, or 926 lbs/MWh. This standard is based on the 
emissions performance of a new CCGT unit.61 
New York 
The State of New York, which has a number of aggressive greenhouse gas reduction policies, recently adopted 
performance standards for emissions from electric generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 25 MW or 
greater.
62
 The standards vary according to technology. CCGTs, gas-fired stationary internal combustion 
engines, and other types of facilities firing at least 70 percent fossil fuels, are subject to a CO2 limit of either 
925 lbs/MWh gross electrical output (output-based limit) or 120 lbs/MMBtu (input-based limit).63 Facilities 
firing liquid fuels or a mix of liquid and gaseous fuels must comply with a standard of either 1,450 lbs/MWh 
(output-based limit) or 160 lbs/MMBtu (input-based limit). The standards apply to any entity that proposes to 
construct a new major electric generating facility or to expand an existing electric generating facility by 
increasing its electrical output capacity by at least 25 MW.  
Washington 
Washington State’s emission performance standard is almost identical to California’s EPS. The CO2 
performance standard is the lower of: (a) 1,100 lbs/MWh, or (b) the average available greenhouse gas 
emissions output of CCGTs, as determined and updated by the Washington Department of Commerce (DOC). 
                                                          
59
 University College London, “CO2 Emission Performance Standards: A Submission to the UK Select Committee on Energy and Climate 
Change,” October 2010, available at: http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/law-environment/files/2012/12/Think-piece-3-Macrory.pdf. Science 
Daily, “Power Emissions Limits to Save Most Carbon at Least Cost, Study Suggests,” January 21, 2009, available at: 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/01/090120171459.htm 
60
 The Canadian standard also has special provisions for existing units that were commissioned during the years 1970 to 1974, which 
are subject to the performance standard at the end of 2019, and units commissioned during the years 1980–1985, which are subject 
to the performance standard at the end of 2029. 
61 See “Harper Government Moves Forward on Tough Rules for Coal-Fired Electricity Sector,” September 5, 2012, available at: 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-1&news=4D34AE9B-1768-415D-A546-8CCF09010A23. See also, 
Government of Canada, Canada Gazette, “Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of Electricity 
Regulations,” August 30, 2012, accessed April 22, 2013, available at: http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2012/2012-09-12/html/sor-
dors167-eng.html. 
62 
See 6 NYCRR Part 251. 
63 
Output-based limits refer to a measure of the emissions per unit of energy output (lbs/MWh), while input-based limits refer to the 
emissions per unit of fuel energy input (lbs/MMBtu).  
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The DOC is required to survey new, commercially available CCGTs every five years and adjust the “average 
available” greenhouse gas emissions output based on its findings.
64
 The standard applies to new in-state 
baseload generation, new long-term contracts, and existing coal-fired generation facilities after 2020. Both 
investor-owned utilities and customer-owned utilities must comply with the regulation.
65
  
The Washington performance standard also allows utilities to submit plans for compliance through the 
permanent sequestration of carbon through CCS technology. These plans must demonstrate financial, 
technical, and economic feasibility; the sequestration must begin within five years of plant operation; and 
penalty provisions apply should the plan fail to achieve adequate CO2 reductions on schedule.
66
  
Oregon 
Oregon’s SB 101 was also modeled after California’s EPS and precludes LSEs, publicly owned utilities, and 
consumer-owned utilities from investing in or signing long-term contracts with baseload generating facilities 
with CO2 emissions at or greater than 1,100 lbs/MWh. This requirement applies to long-term contracts with 
generation units that are either in-state or out-of-state.
67
 Notably, Oregon’s law explicitly excludes life-cycle 
emissions of the fuel from the determination of a facility’s total emissions.68 
Montana 
Under a 2007 Montana law, utilities may not acquire an equity interest in or lease a facility or equipment used 
to generate electricity that is primarily fueled by coal and that is constructed after January 1, 2007 unless a 
minimum of 50 percent of the CO2 is captured and stored. The law effectively only applies to one utility in 
Montana—Northwest Energy—and it applies only when the utility is seeking approval of a resource that it has 
not previously contracted with or held an equity interest in. The law’s effectiveness is limited since it does not 
cover rural electric cooperatives, which serve about a third of the state’s electric demand.69 
Illinois 
Illinois adopted SB 1987 in 2009, establishing a Clean Coal Portfolio Standard. The law requires each utility to 
serve at least 5 percent of its total supply with “initial clean coal facilities” by 2015, and has a goal of meeting 
25 percent of the state’s demand for electricity with “clean coal” facilities. Under SB 1987, “clean coal” is 
                                                          
64
 See Washington S.B. 6001; see also “Regulatory Assistance Project Research Brief: Emissions Performance Standards in Selected 
States,” at 3, November 2009. 
65
 RCW 80.80.040, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standards – Rules – Sequestration, available at: 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=80.80.040. 
66
 SB 6001, Section 5, Subsections (11)-(13). 
67
 OAR 860.085. 
68
 See Oregon S.B. 101; see also “Regulatory Assistance Project Research Brief: Emissions Performance Standards in Selected States,” at 
5, November 2009. 
69
 See Montana H.B. 25; see also “Regulatory Assistance Project Research Brief: Emissions Performance Standards in Selected States,” 
at 4, November 2009. 
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defined by the level of CO2 reduction achieved through CCS. The law requires 50 percent capture for facilities 
beginning operation before 2016, 70 percent capture for facilities beginning operation in 2016 or 2017, and 90 
percent capture for facilities coming online after 2017.
70
 
3.3. Key Features of CESs in Other Jurisdictions 
The existing and proposed CESs reviewed in this report fall into three categories of policy design: 
1) Performance standards applied to power plants (U.S. EPA Greenhouse Gas NSPS for Power 
Plants, United Kingdom, Canada, New York). These standards generally affect new or 
expanded plants or (in one case) very old plants. Because these standards are applied to 
generators, there is no need for a system that tracks generation to LSEs. There is also no risk of 
shuffling. 
2) Standards applied to LSEs that prohibit them from investing in, or signing long-term 
contracts with, CO2 intensive sources (California, Washington, Oregon, Montana).
71 These 
standards seek to reduce demand for electricity from CO2 intensive plants. If they succeed in 
doing so, they may also provide benefits to existing or new “clean” plants, but the primary 
policy goal is to put pressure on high-emitting plants. These standards are implemented 
through review of, or mandatory reporting of, an LSE’s equity holdings and long-term 
contracts. There is no need to track all electricity in the region to an LSE.72 There is some risk 
of “contract shuffling” in this type of policy, where LSEs switch from long-term contracts to 
transactions in the spot market (or below year-limit contracts) to avoid regulation and 
emissions reductions do not occur. Standards applied to LSE investments or long-term 
contracts in power plants are only applicable to vertically integrated utilities. In restructured 
states, like Massachusetts, LSEs do not own generation and generally do not enter into long-
term contracts with specific generators. In Massachusetts, the investor-owned utilities procure 
electricity for basic service customers from wholesale suppliers for periods of three months to 
one year, with the primary exception of legislatively mandated long-term contracts for 
renewable energy. 
3) Standards applied to LSEs that require them to cover some portion of their sales portfolio 
with credits from specific resources (Bingaman Clean Energy Standard Act, Obama Clean 
Energy Standard Proposal). These proposals would require a new system of tradable credits. 
Eligible plants would generate a credit with each MWh produced. (Some technologies may 
generate a partial credit with each MWh.) As with their RPS compliance, LSEs would be 
                                                          
70
 See SB 1987, available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/95/PDF/095-1027.pdf.  
71
 The Illinois standard is a variation on this category. It requires LSEs to invest in clean coal. 
72
 A standard that is implemented through contracts that require an action are typically easier to monitor and enforce because the 
regulatory body only needs to review the contracts that contain the required actions. Conversely, contracts that restrict a certain 
action can be more difficult to monitor because the regulatory body would need to review every contract to ensure that the 
restricted action is not being taken.  
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required to hold credits covering a defined percentage of their total sales. Applied at the 
national level, shuffling would be avoided if the policy covered all (or nearly all) power plants 
and LSEs throughout the country. Shuffling could be avoided at the state level if, during policy 
design, regulators were cognizant of total expected supply of and demand for credits, setting 
the portfolio percentage requirement to ensure that the standard resulted in altered plant 
build or retirement decisions, and/or altered dispatch of existing plants.  
In addition to these three policy design categories, it is worth noting that, to our knowledge, no jurisdiction has 
adopted a CES in which: LSEs are required to hold a credit for every MWh sold; each eligible plant produces 
credits with a unique CO2 emission rate; or the pool of credits is much larger than demand for the credits. In 
New England, NEPOOL GIS creates certificates for every MWh generated and sold that include emission 
information from the plant that generated the MWh; however, GIS does not enforce regulations or track the 
exact emissions from each specific generating unit to a particular LSE. 
A final key point taken from our analysis of other jurisdictions is that in cases where a jurisdiction has an 
existing or proposed CES in addition to participating in a cap-and-trade program—California and the United 
Kingdom—the expectation of analysts and policy makers is that the CES will act as one of several measures to 
achieve emission reductions under the cap, and that the emission cap will be lowered in future years in 
response to the CES and other successful mitigation programs. 
Table 11, below, summarizes the key policy design characteristics of the CES policies reviewed in this section 
and identifies whether the proposed federal regulation or state policy is technology neutral. For this purpose, a 
CES policy is technology neutral if all electricity generating technologies are allowed to participate, and their 
participation is managed by a technology independent criterion such as carbon intensity, as opposed to a CES 
policy that does not allow certain technologies to participate. It is important to note that both “lbs/MWh 
performance standards” and “share-of-retail-sales portfolio standards” have the potential to be either 
technology neutral or technology specific depending on their design. 
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Table 11. Main Characteristics of Existing Emission Performance Standards (table continues on following two pages) 
Federal Regulation 
or State 
Applicability Technology 
Neutral? 
Form of Standard Pollutants 
Covered 
Plants or 
LSEs 
Tracking 
System 
Obama Clean 
Energy Standard 
Proposal 
Utility portfolios No - credits given to 
sources based on 
the source's specific 
technology 
Requirement for an increasing 
percentage of electricity sold to be 
"clean"  
CO2 LSEs Tradable 
credits 
Bingaman Clean 
Energy Standard 
Act 
Utility portfolios Yes - credits 
calculated by plant 
emission rate 
(annual sales 
greater than 2 
million MWh), not 
set by category of 
technology 
Requirement for an increasing 
percentage of electricity sold to be 
"clean" as defined, starting at 24% 
in 2015, rising to 84% by 2035 
CO2 LSEs Tradable 
credits 
U.S. EPA 
(Greenhouse Gas 
NSPS for Power 
Plants) 
New (post April 13, 2012) fossil-
fueled electric generating units 
No - applies only to 
fossil fuel-fired units 
greater than 25 MW 
1,000 lbs CO2/MWh CO2 Plants 
(new) 
Emissions 
would be 
reported 
through EPA's 
data systems 
California  
(SB 1368) 
New and existing baseload 
generation owned or under long-
term contract to publicly owned 
utilities; all existing CCGTs are 
deemed compliant until significant 
upgrades (increase capacity by 
10MW) 
Yes - applies to 
each baseload 
generator with a 
capacity factor 60% 
or higher 
Emission rate of 1,100 lbs CO2 per 
MWh; based on performance of 
existing CA CCGTs 
CO2 LSEs Reporting of 
investments 
and long-term 
contracts 
subject to EPS 
United Kingdom New fossil-fueled generation of 
50MW or more; plants in CCS 
program are exempt 
No - applies only to 
fossil fuel-fired units 
greater than 50 MW 
Emission rate of 450 g CO2/kWh 
or 992 lbs CO2/MWh; based on 
performance of a new CCGT 
CO2 Plants 
(new) 
To be based 
on the EU 
Emissions 
Trading 
System (ETS) 
Canada New coal generation and existing 
coal plants 50 years old or older 
 
 
No - applies only to 
coal-fired generation 
Emission rate of 926 lbs 
CO2/MWh; based on performance 
on a new CCGT 
CO2 Plants 
(new and 
very old) 
Annual 
performance 
report 
submitted 
through 
electronic data 
system 
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. A Clean Energy Standard for Massachusetts – Final Report 37  
Federal Regulation 
or State 
Applicability Technology 
Neutral? 
Form of Standard Pollutants 
Covered 
Plants or 
LSEs 
Tracking 
System 
 
New York Any entity seeking to construct a 
new major electric generating 
facility or modify an existing facility 
so as to increase the capacity by 
at least 25 MW 
No - applies only to 
fossil fuel facilities 
(firing liquid fuels or 
a mix of liquid and 
gaseous fuels) 
Boilers that fire at least 70% fossil 
fuels, CCGTs, and stationary 
internal combustion engines must 
meet a limit of either 925 lbs/MWh 
or 120 lbs/MMBtu; simple cycle 
combustion turbines and 
stationary internal combustion 
engines that fire either liquid fuel 
or liquid and gaseous fuel 
simultaneously must meet a CO2 
emission limit of either 1450 
lbs/MWh or 160 lbs/MMBtu; other 
types of generators, like biomass 
and waste-to-energy facilities, are 
required to propose a case-
specific CO2 limit 
CO2 Plants 
(new or 
expanded) 
Emissions 
reporting 
similar to 
reporting on 
other pollutants 
Washington  
(SB 6001) 
New and existing baseload 
generation owned or under long-
term contract to publicly owned 
utilities; existing cogeneration 
facilities fueled by natural gas or 
waste gas are exempt until 
upgraded or subject to new 
ownership interest 
Yes - applies to all 
baseload generation 
in operation after 
June 30, 2008 
The lower of: (1) 1,100 lbs CO2 
per MWh or (2) the average 
emission rate of new, 
commercially available CCGTs, as 
determined by the state every five 
years (starting in 2013) 
CO2 LSEs Reporting of 
investments 
and long-term 
contracts 
Oregon  
(ORS 469.503 & 
OAR 345-024-0500) 
New and existing baseload 
generation owned or under long-
term contract to publicly owned 
utilities; sources that use natural 
gas or petroleum distillates for 
peaking or to integrate energy 
from renewable energy sources 
are exempt; renewables are 
exempt (renewable does not 
include biomass) 
Yes - applies to all 
generation facilities 
Emission rate of 1,100 lbs CO2 per 
MWh; calculation of emission 
explicitly excludes life cycle 
emissions for obtaining the fuel 
used at the facility 
CO2 LSEs Reporting of 
investments 
and long-term 
contracts 
Montana  
(HB0025) 
New (post January 1, 2007) coal 
facilities in which formerly 
restructured Montana utilities are 
No - applies only to 
coal facilities 
constructed after 
Any new contract or equity interest 
in coal generating facilities by a 
formerly restructured utility is 
CO2 LSEs Reporting of 
investments 
and contracts 
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Federal Regulation 
or State 
Applicability Technology 
Neutral? 
Form of Standard Pollutants 
Covered 
Plants or 
LSEs 
Tracking 
System 
seeking a new equity interest or 
contract 
January 1, 2007 prohibited unless the facility uses 
CCS to capture and sequester at 
least 50% of CO2 emissions 
with 
procurement 
plans 
Illinois  
(SB 1987) 
Illinois utilities' energy supply 
portfolios 
No - applies only to 
coal facilities using 
CCS 
Requires utilities to serve at least 
5% of their load with "clean coal" 
beginning in 2015 and increasing 
to 25% by 2025; "clean coal" is 
defined as: a facility that 
sequesters 50% of its CO2 for 
facilities beginning operation 
before 2016, 70% for facilities 
starting up in 2016 and 2017, and 
90% for facilities commencing 
operation after 2017 
CO2 (also 
SO2, NOx, 
PM, CO, 
and 
Mercury) 
LSEs Sourcing 
agreements 
with “clean 
coal” facilities 
must be filed 
with 
procurement 
plans 
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4. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL CES POLICY DESIGNS 
After cataloging the forms that CES policies have taken in the United States and abroad, Synapse 
performed a qualitative assessment of potential CES design options for Massachusetts, including 
detailed analysis of the two policy designs found to be most feasible. Six potential CES designs for 
Massachusetts were identified: (1) performance standards for power plants; (2) performance standards 
for suppliers; (3) portfolio standards for suppliers; (4) limiting long-term contracts with high-emissions 
generators; (5) requiring long-term contracts with low-emissions generators; and (6) requiring suppliers 
to purchase and retire Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) allowances. Table 12 introduces each 
design in turn.  
Table 12: Potential CES Designs 
 
From these six designs, the second and third—the LSE performance standard and the LSE portfolio 
standard—were determined to be the most feasible for Massachusetts. Detailed qualitative analysis 
revealed several serious practical concerns with implementing an LSE performance standard in the 
Commonwealth. For this reason, the modeling described in Section 4 was conducted only on the LSE 
portfolio standard design. 
In this section, we discuss our qualitative analysis of the six CES design options beginning with an 
overview of impacts that CES regulation would have on the dynamics of the electricity sector. 
4.1. CES Impacts on the Electricity Sector: An Overview 
Electricity-Sector Dispatch and Investment 
The system dynamics of any change to an electricity-sector market can be complex, and changes in one 
electricity-sector market—energy, capacity, financial transactions, RGGI auctions, RECs—tend to have 
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impacts on many of the related markets. In order to capture these interactions, CES design will be 
described in this report in terms of its effects on the various electricity-sector markets, as shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Electricity-Sector Markets Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
A CES policy works by causing a shift in the dispatch of electricity generation (when and how much each 
generating unit operates), a change in expected investment or retirements, or both. A CES can affect 
plant operating costs, bid prices, and—as a result—capacity factors. LSE-based standards require 
electricity suppliers to demand more low-CO2 generation, increasing the hours of operation of these 
resources. All CES design options considered have the potential to shift the regional generation mix—in 
the short-run by shifting dispatch, and in the longer run by changing the incentives for what types of 
generation resources are built. 
A shift in dispatch  
New England electricity generators submit bids to the ISO-NE each day for how much electricity they are 
willing to produce at what prices. Their bid prices are required to be the variable cost (i.e., excluding 
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capital costs) of producing a MWh of electricity. ISO-NE creates a “bid stack,” lining up the generators’ 
bids from the least to the most expensive, and—beginning with the least expensive bid—accepts the 
bids necessary to meet that day’s forecasted retail sales of electricity. A shift in dispatch is a change in 
the composition of the bid stack either in generators’ bid prices or in the amount of electricity that a 
generator is willing to produce for a given price. Given a fixed set of generators bidding into a system 
(that is, assuming that there will be no new investment or retirements) and fixed retail sales, electricity 
greenhouse gas emissions will not change unless dispatch—how much each resource generates—
changes. Emissions change when generation from high-CO2 plants is replaced with generation from low-
CO2 plants. 
Many examples of shifts in dispatch discussed in this report involve CES certificate prices that, when 
included in variable costs, change a generator’s bid price. It is important to recall, however, that not just 
any change to variable cost will shift dispatch. In order to change dispatch and, therefore, emissions, 
variable costs must change sufficiently to cause two or more resources to swap places in the bid stack. 
Smaller changes to variable cost may affect power-plant revenues and, as a result, incentives for future 
investments, but leave dispatch unaffected.  
A change in expected investment or retirements 
CES policies may also cause a change in expected investment either indirectly as a result of shifts in 
dispatch, or directly via limitations or requirements regarding long-term contracts and investments in 
generation resources. Increased revenues or additional long-term contracts for certain types of 
resources spur investment in these technologies, while reduced revenues or fewer long-term contracts 
can result in additional retirements for particular resource types. 
Understanding Power-Plant and LSE Implementation 
A CES policy may be applied either to power plants (supply-side regulation) or LSEs (demand-side 
regulation). In this section, we review the pros and cons of power-plant versus LSE implementation of a 
Massachusetts CES, focusing on probable emissions and economic impacts. 
Supply- and demand-side CES differ in several ways, as summarized in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Comparison of Supply- and Demand-Side CES 
 
Supply-Side CES: Regulating Power Plants 
Emission standards applied to power plants typically require generators to adopt a certain technology or 
meet a defined emission rate. Currently, most supply-side CES policies apply only to new or expanded 
plants. Canada’s power-plant performance standard is unique in that it applies to certain existing plants 
as well as new ones. Massachusetts regulators have the authority to establish a CO2 performance 
standard for new facilities in the state.73 It is, however, unlikely that any company is considering 
construction of a new coal-fired plant in Massachusetts, so a standard set with the goal of preventing 
new coal construction such as those implemented in other jurisdictions would likely have no impact on 
emissions. A new-source performance standard would likely only have an effect in Massachusetts if the 
performance standard were set low enough to exclude certain natural gas generation technologies from 
being built in Massachusetts or to require CCS at new gas plants or higher emitting power generators.  
Performance standards applied to existing plants are more complex. Power plants currently have few 
cost-effective options for reducing CO2 emission rates (e.g., oil and coal-fired units that can also combust 
gas could increase gas combustion; this is not an option for gas-fired units). Thus, their only opportunity 
for compliance in many cases would be to close, unless alternative compliance pathways are allowed. 
One potential compliance pathway would be the use of greenhouse gas offsets.74 Offsets are credits for 
emission reductions achieved offsite, usually via emission reduction or carbon sequestration projects. 
Many CO2 programs allow sources to treat offsets as if they were onsite emission reductions, effectively 
reducing plant emission rates. 
Plant retirements and/or offsets would reduce CO2 emissions in Massachusetts, and would be captured 
in the Commonwealth’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory, which assumes that all generation at 
                                                          
73
  Chapter 298 of the Acts of 2008. https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2008/Chapter298. 
74
 Massachusetts had a CO2 performance standard and offset program affecting the six largest Massachusetts power plants 
(part of regulation 310 CMR 7.29 Emissions Standards for Power Plants), but this program was phased out with the advent of 
RGGI. 
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Massachusetts power plants is consumed in Massachusetts. In Section 4.4, we examine ways in which 
such reductions would interact with the RGGI emissions cap. A performance standard that allowed for 
offsets would generate CO2 reductions through offset projects. As an additional measure, a CES could 
limit offsets to projects located in Massachusetts, improving the chance that financial benefits from 
these investments would remain within the Commonwealth, but this restriction would also make offsets 
more expensive and would require careful oversight to avoid double-counting of offsets with other 
existing climate strategies. 
To verify compliance with a supply-side CES in Massachusetts, regulators could use the Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) existing greenhouse gas reporting system. This idea 
is discussed further in Section 4.3. 
The economic impacts of a supply-side CES may be viewed from the point of view of either electricity 
ratepayers or generators. A performance standard for power plants would increase the cost of 
electricity generation in Massachusetts, but this increase would not be born entirely by Massachusetts 
ratepayers. New England pools its generation resources, so the increased generation costs would likely 
be shared by ratepayers outside Massachusetts. For generators, however, costs would be limited to 
companies operating high-emitting plants in Massachusetts; these companies would incur the cost of 
either plant retirements or offset projects. 
Demand-Side CES: Regulating Load-Serving Entities   
A CES applied to LSEs reduces emissions indirectly, by requiring LSEs to purchase more low-CO2 
electricity, increasing demand for low-CO2 energy and reducing demand for high-CO2 energy. There are 
four basic demand-side CES designs. 
 LSEs can be required to meet a “performance standard,” to purchase electricity for 
resale with an average emission rate below a specified level. 
 LSEs can be required to meet a “portfolio standard,” to purchase a certain percentage of 
electricity from certain types of plants, defined in the standard.  
 LSEs can be prohibited from entering into certain types of contracts or investments. 
 LSEs can be required to enter into certain types of contract or investments. 
LSE-based performance and portfolio standards can also allow for offsets. In this case, LSEs would 
comply by purchasing more low-CO2 electricity and/or investing in offset projects. While here we 
compare the emissions and economic impacts of these demand-side CES designs, the policies also differ 
in the level of support they provide to new renewable and low-CO2 power projects.  
Emission reductions from a demand-side CES would be spread throughout New England or even beyond. 
Because Massachusetts LSEs purchase electricity from plants throughout the ISO-NE region, these 
emission reductions might or might not be reflected in the current Massachusetts Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory. Again, potential interactions between emission reductions and the RGGI program are 
discussed in Section 4.4. 
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In terms of compliance, unlike supply-side performance standards, demand-side CES designs require a 
system for suppliers to determine and report the sources of the electricity they purchase for resale. A 
standard that required LSEs to maintain a percentage of low-CO2 generation or a portfolio average 
emission rate would require a system of tradable certificates. A standard that prohibits certain types of 
investments or contracts, however, would require mandated reporting of investments and long-term 
contracts. Potential tracking systems for Massachusetts are discussed in detail in Section 4.3.  
A CES applied to LSEs would have the same types of economic impacts as one applied to power plants, 
but the impacts would be distributed differently. With a demand-side CES, Massachusetts LSEs would 
pass the increased supply costs directly to their customers—all of whom would be in Massachusetts. 
These increased generation costs would impact only Massachusetts rate-payers. From the generators’ 
perspective, however, changes in revenues would occur at power plants throughout the ISO-NE region. 
Note that the distribution of impacts from demand-side implementation is the reverse of the 
distribution from supply-side implementation; with supply-side CES designs, rate impacts are dispersed 
across the region but changes in power plant revenues are concentrated in the state with the standard. 
4.2. Comparing Performance and Portfolio Standards 
Regulatory designs for limiting greenhouse gas emissions fall into two categories: those based on 
average emission rates (performance standards) and those applied to a certain share of suppliers’ retail 
sales (portfolio standards). This section examines the workings of each type of standard in terms of 
technical feasibility and political viability for Massachusetts. Section 4.3 discusses concerns with 
shuffling under a Massachusetts portfolio standard. 
Performance Standards 
A performance-standard-based CES sets a requirement that energy, either provided or purchased, be at 
or below a specified average lbs/MWh CO2 emission rate. In principle, performance standards may be 
applied to either generators or LSEs; however, as discussed in this section, demand-side implementation 
is complicated and lacks any known precedent. 
Performance standards for generators 
Supply-side implementation—requiring power plants to maintain emission rates at or below a lbs/MWh 
standard—is relatively straightforward: Public policy mandates a maximum emission rate and 
generators are obligated to comply. The United Kingdom, Canada, and New York have lbs/MWh 
performance standards for new or newly expanded power plants; Canada’s standard also applies to 
existing plants 50 years or older. 
Figure 3 illustrates a CES requiring power plants to maintain emission rates below a given lbs/MWh 
standard (refer back to Figure 2 for a version of this diagram without the superimposed red text 
describing the CES design). This type of standard could either result directly in high-emission plants 
retiring or, as shown in the schematic, CCS or other emission-reduction methods could raise the bid 
price for high emission resources, shifting dispatch towards lower-emission resources. A higher bid price 
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that did not clear in the energy market on a particular day would also mean lower revenues for these 
plants, and a reduced incentive for investments in these types of technologies. 
Figure 3: CES #1: Set Power Plant Emission Standards Schematic  
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
In the case of a Massachusetts CES, there are several important nuances in policy design. First, as 
discussed above, a supply-side performance standard for existing generators would force plants with 
emission rates above the legal threshold to close or, for future-year standards, make plans to install still-
developing CCS technologies. A performance standard that permitted offsets could allow high-emitting 
plants to continue operating while meeting the standard. Second, Massachusetts regulators only have 
the authority to regulate plants in Massachusetts. Therefore, they can only affect a small number of the 
high-emitting plants in the region. In contrast, a standard applied to LSEs serving Massachusetts may 
have the potential to affect the highest emitting plants in the region, regardless of where those plants 
are located. This is because Massachusetts LSEs purchase electricity from plants throughout ISO-NE, and 
the Commonwealth’s LSEs sell considerably more electricity than Massachusetts plants generate. 
A third important consideration is the level of aggregation at which the emission rate is applied. From 
the plant owner’s point of view, a performance standard set at the individual unit level requires the 
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most effort for compliance. In contrast, a standard that applies to the average emission rate of a multi-
unit plant or to the average across all units—and resource types—in an owner’s fleet allows more 
flexibility in compliance and may, therefore, result in less overall emission abatement. A lbs/MWh 
standard applied at the fleet level to GenOn, for example, would set a maximum emissions rate for 
average emissions across GenOn’s Massachusetts oil and gas units (or, if the CES were applied to the 
region as a whole, to its coal, natural gas, and oil units), and would allow the company to change the 
composition or output of its Massachusetts-based fleet with the goal of reducing this rate. Similarly, 
standards may vary in whether they require a particular emission rate for a particular year or whether 
the rate may be averaged over multiple years of operation, as is the case in the EPA’s proposed New 
Source Performance Standard. 
MassDEP’s facility greenhouse gas reporting requirements appear sufficient to support a performance 
standard in the Commonwealth with very little modification. Some Massachusetts generators also 
report information to the EPA and RGGI “COATS” system (discussed in Section 4.3), and MassDEP's 
greenhouse gas reporting regulation requires such plants to verify that they are reporting the same data 
to EPA and MassDEP. Each unit could be assigned its actual emission rate—based on data reported to 
EPA and MassDEP—or, alternatively, units could be assigned the average New England emission rate for 
their class of plant. Because the latter system would not give plants credit for improvements in their 
emission rates, it would tend to prioritize retirements or CCS installation (thereby changing the class of 
the plant) over changes in unit efficiency with associated incremental reductions in emission rates. 
MassDEP’s requirements would dictate the minimum capacity below which plants are excluded from 
CES compliance, and the reporting requirements could be amended if necessary to apply to additional 
plants in the Commonwealth to encompass units subject to a CES. 
As discussed below, a supply-side CES may be politically infeasible for Massachusetts because of the 
time and effort involved in achieving the recent changes to the RGGI cap and trade system. 
Performance standards for LSEs 
Demand-side implementation—requiring each LSE to maintain an average emission rate at or below a 
lbs/MWh standard—is a more complicated proposition. Under this policy design, Massachusetts LSEs 
must purchase lbs/MWh-denominated certificates from New England (and, potentially, certain 
Canadian) power plants. Two systems for assessing an LSE’s average emission rate seem most plausible: 
(1) LSEs must purchase a lbs/MWh certificate for every MWh sold; or (2) LSEs have the option of 
purchasing certificates and are assigned the residual average emission rate for the MWh for which they 
do not have certificates. Our review of CES designs employed in other jurisdictions did not reveal any 
existing demand-side performance standard policies, and our own analysis of this option is that it may 
prove impractical to implement. 
Figure 4 illustrates a CES policy requiring LSEs to meet an average emissions rate for their retail sales. 
Compliance verification for such a policy would require LSEs to purchase certificates for low-emission 
MWh (in addition to their purchase of RECs); LSEs would receive the residual average emission rate for 
MWh sold for which they do not own a CES or REC certificate. Revenues to low-emission generators 
from the CES certificate market would lower their bid prices and shift dispatch in their favor. Lower bid 
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prices coupled with more frequent dispatch would also result in higher profits for low-emission 
resources, and more incentive for investment in lower-emitting technologies like renewables and 
natural gas. 
Figure 4: CES #2: Set an LSE Performance Standard Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
If LSEs are required to purchase certificates for every MWh sold, the market for certificates may become 
more difficult to implement as the total demand for certificates approaches the total supply of 
certificates. In a demand-side performance standard applied to all of New England (with Canadian 
sources excluded from selling certificates), for example, every certificate in circulation would be 
required for purchase. LSEs could find it challenging to purchase a mix of certificates with the desired 
average emission rate, and certificate prices would likely include a cost associated with this 
“administrative friction”—that is, the potential costly challenge of connecting sellers to buyers in this 
complex market. Even in a Massachusetts-only CES, in which LSEs serving the Commonwealth would 
require about half of the certificates produced, competition for the more desirable, low-emission rate 
certificates could be high. While strong competition leading to high certificate prices and robust 
incentives for investment in low-emissions generation resources is important to success in CES emission 
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reductions, administrative friction could reduce the certificate market’s efficiency, raising the cost per 
unit of emissions eliminated. 
A CES in which LSEs are assigned the residual average emission rate for the MWh for which they have 
not purchased certificates would come with its own administrative hurdles. (As noted below in Section 
4.3, LSEs in New England currently rely on the residual average—the characteristics of all the certificates 
not sold—to reduce the compliance burden of disclosure requirements.) The residual average emission 
rate cannot be known until after certificate trading is closed. LSEs, therefore, would be buying 
certificates without knowing the residual rate—making it difficult to tailor purchases with the goal of 
achieving a particular lbs/MWh average for their retail sales. A “true-up” period of additional trading 
could partially resolve this problem but, again, the post-true-up-period residual would not be known 
until true-up trading was closed. As a result, LSEs would need to make their certificate purchases using a 
conservative (high) assumption regarding the residual emission rate, which, on the whole, would likely 
result in higher than required emission reductions for Massachusetts. 
Whether or not LSEs are required to purchase a certificate for each MWh sold, the market for these 
lbs/MWh certificates would be difficult both to administer and to participate in, for buyers and sellers 
alike. Unlike buying and selling MWh of electricity, RGGI allowances, or RECs—or any typical, 
homogenous market commodity—each plant would be issued certificates with unique emission rates (as 
is the case in the existing NEPOOL GIS tracking system). There would be no single price for a certificate, 
but rather a different price for each certificate with a different emission rate. While complex markets 
exist for sets of similar products with varying attributes—consider the “market for coal,” which is really a 
group of interrelated markets for coals of varying heat rates and sulfur contents—we are not aware of a 
government-administered market for a non-homogenous allowance, credit, or certificate. The prices of 
these non-homogenous CES certificates would be interrelated but might not be proportional to their 
emission-rate “face value.” 
Despite their administrative difficulties, lbs/MWh performance standards may nonetheless be 
considered an attractive policy option because they have the benefit of being, on the surface, 
“technology neutral.” A CES policy is technology neutral if all electricity generating technologies are 
allowed to participate, and their participation is managed by a technology-independent criterion such as 
carbon intensity, as opposed to a CES policy that does not allow certain technologies to participate. 
It is, however, important to note that while lbs/MWh is a neutral metric, the selection of the standard’s 
level of lbs/MWh stringency will be made with full knowledge of the respective emissions rates of each 
resource type and class of plants. A performance standard’s emission rate threshold could be set with 
the goal of achieving a certain level of emission reductions, or with the goal of excluding certain 
technologies from receiving credits. Setting a performance standard at 2,000 lbs/MWh (slightly lower 
than the typical emission rate of a conventional coal plant) will have a very different impact on dispatch 
by technology type than would a 800 lbs/MWh standard (slightly lower than the typical emission rate of 
a combined-cycle gas plant). As discussed in the next section, performance standards are no more 
technology neutral in their application than are portfolio standards.  
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Portfolio Standards  
Portfolio-standard-based CES policies apply to LSEs (and not power plants), and regulate the emissions 
mix or composition of the fuel use of each LSE’s “portfolio” of generation resources. Three types of 
portfolio standards exist: 
1) LSEs must maintain a particular fuel or resource-type mix, or minimum or maximum 
shares of retail sales from certain fuel or resource types. RPS policies, an increasingly 
common example of this type of policy design, use RECs as a compliance currency, 
where each REC represents 1 MWh of renewable electricity. LSEs comply with the RPS 
by purchasing and retiring RECs equal to the compliance level as compared to their 
sales. For example, if an LSE had 1,000 MWh of sales and the RPS requirement were 10 
percent in a given year, then the LSE would be obligated to purchase and retire 100 
RECs in that year. Massachusetts’ RPS requires LSEs to purchase eligible Class I RECs 
equal to 15 percent of their retail sales in 2020, with the requirement rising by 1 
percentage point each year thereafter. Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Vermont—among many other states across the Unites 
States—all have RPS policies. The goal of the Massachusetts CES, however, as described 
in the CECP, is to reduce emissions over and above those reductions effected by the RPS 
and other existing policies, and Massachusetts’ RPS is already one of the most stringent 
in the country for years after 2020.75 
2) LSEs must achieve a particular share of zero-CO2 generation, where all electricity 
supply is defined as either CO2 emitting or CO2 non-emitting. An example of this type 
of policy for Massachusetts would be setting a 25 percent non-emitting requirement for 
each LSE’s retail sales. In 2020, for an LSE with 1,000 MWh in sales, the first 150 MWh of 
non-emitting generation would be covered by the LSE’s RPS compliance—and subject to 
the particular dictates of the RPS’s specifications for allowable renewables—and the 
remaining 100 MWh could come from any non-emitting source, including nuclear and 
large, existing hydro. As discussed in Section 4.3, the best verification system for this 
policy design would be the NEPOOL GIS system. 
3) LSEs must achieve a particular share of low-CO2 generation, where electricity supply is 
characterized by its emission levels. This type of portfolio standard is the system 
proposed in the Obama and Bingaman Clean Energy Standards, which would create a 
new, national certificate trading program in Massachusetts. NEPOOL GIS would allow 
verification of such a standard. 
This third portfolio standard design has the virtue of being “technology neutral” in the same sense that 
performance standards are technology neutral (see above). While more simplistic methods for assigning 
                                                          
75
 See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency website, http://www.dsireusa.org/ 
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certificate values exist (e.g., 1.0 credits/MWh for renewables and 0.5 credits/MWh for natural gas), the 
credit assignments may instead be made in proportion to each resource’s effective emission reduction 
in relation to the average emissions rate of a particular resource or class of resources (see Table 14).  
Table 14: Assignment of Portfolio Standard Credits 
 
Source: EIA Form 860 2012; AMP Data 2012. 
Threshold Resource: Natural Gas Combustion Turbine (1,300 lbs/MWh)
Resource 
Type
Resource Emission 
Rate (lbs/MWh)
Gas CT Plant 
Emission Rate 
(lbs/MWh)
Effective Emission 
Reduction (lbs/MWh)
Potential        
"Avoided Emission" 
Credits per MWh
a b b - a (b - a)/b
Nuclear 0 1,300 1,300 1.00
Hydro 0 1,300 1,300 1.00
Solar 0 1,300 1,300 1.00
Wind 0 1,300 1,300 1.00
Gas CC 1,100 1,300 200 0.15
Gas CT 1,300 1,300 0 0.00
Oil ST 1,900 1,300 0 0.00
Coal ST 2,200 1,300 0 0.00
Threshold Resource: Oil Steam Turbine (1,900 lbs/MWh)
Resource 
Type
Resource Emission 
Rate (lbs/MWh)
Oil ST Emission Rate 
(lbs/MWh)
Effective Emission 
Reduction (lbs/MWh)
Potential        
"Avoided Emission" 
Credits per MWh
a b b - a (b - a)/b
Nuclear 0 1,900 1,900 1.00
Hydro 0 1,900 1,900 1.00
Solar 0 1,900 1,900 1.00
Wind 0 1,900 1,900 1.00
Gas CC 1,100 1,900 800 0.42
Gas CT 1,300 1,900 600 0.32
Oil ST 1,900 1,900 0 0.00
Coal ST 2,200 1,900 0 0.00
Threshold Resource: Coal Steam Turbine (2,200 lbs/MWh)
Resource 
Type
Resource Emission 
Rate (lbs/MWh)
Coal ST Emission 
Rate (lbs/MWh)
Effective Emission 
Reduction (lbs/MWh)
Potential        
"Avoided Emission" 
Credits per MWh
a b b - a (b - a)/b
Nuclear 0 2,200 2,200 1.00
Hydro 0 2,200 2,200 1.00
Solar 0 2,200 2,200 1.00
Wind 0 2,200 2,200 1.00
Gas CC 1,100 2,200 1,100 0.50
Gas CT 1,300 2,200 900 0.41
Oil ST 1,900 2,200 300 0.14
Coal ST 2,200 2,200 0 0.00
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Table 14 reports typical (not unit-specific) credits assignments in relation to three different threshold 
resources using New England average resource-type emissions rates: natural gas combustion turbine 
(1,300 lbs/MWh); an oil steam turbine (1,900 lbs/MWh); and a coal steam turbine (2,200 lbs/MWh). For 
example, Fore River Station 1, a natural gas combined-cycle plant with a 838 lbs/MWh emission rate, 
has a 1,362 lbs/MWh effective emission reduction when compared to the 2,200 lbs/MWh emission rate 
of the average New England coal plant. Fore River Station 1 would receive a 0.36, 0.56, or 0.62-credit 
certificate for each MWh of generation, respectively, depending on the choice of threshold resource.  
Effects on dispatch and investment 
Figure 5 illustrates a CES policy requiring LSEs to buy credits in a new CES-certificate market equal to a 
given percentage of their retail sales, where it is assumed that RECs will be accepted as equivalent to 
CES credits. (To be clear, LSEs would first satisfy CES requirements using REC purchased for RPS 
compliance before purchasing additional CES credits.) Revenues to low-emission generators from the 
CES certificate market would lower their bid prices and shift dispatch in their favor.  
Figure 5: CES #3a: Set an LSE Portfolio Standard in a CES Market Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
c
Load 
Serving 
Entities
Power 
Plants
Customers
ISO-NE Energy Market
$
$
MWh & CO2
$
MWh & CO2
M
W
h
&
 C
O
2
CES Market
RGGI Auction
$
Allowances
Capacity Market
Financial Transactions
RPS REC Market
CES #3a: Set an LSE 
Porfolio Standard
(1) Require LSEs 
to buy credits 
equal to X% of 
their load
(3) Likely lower clearing price
(3) Shift in dispatch: towards 
lower CO2 resources
(3) Lower bid price for low 
emission resources
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. A Clean Energy Standard for Massachusetts – Final Report 52  
Lower bid prices coupled with more frequent dispatch would also result in higher profits for low-
emission resources, and more incentive for investment in lower-emitting technologies like renewables 
and natural gas. 
Alternatively, a portfolio standard could be designed to be implemented in the existing RPS REC market, 
although still administered as a stand-alone CES program. Figure 6 illustrates a process that has identical 
market impacts to a CES portfolio standard with a separate market, although this schematic draws 
attention to a key impact in either portfolio standard design: the effect on REC prices. Any CES design 
that accepts REC certificates for compliance will tend to increase REC prices. 
Figure 6: CES #3b: Set an LSE Portfolio Standard in the REC Market Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
4.3. Verifying Compliance with a CES 
Every form of CES design requires a system for verifying compliance. The following table summarizes the 
verification options available for each of the studied CES designs.  
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Table 15: Methods of Verification for CES Design Options 
 
Verifying Compliance with a Supply-Side CES 
Several requirements for greenhouse gas reporting currently apply to power plants in Massachusetts:  
 Most plants report emissions to the MassDEP and plants over 25 MW report emissions 
to EPA pursuant to the federal Acid Rain Program at Title IV of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 and to the interstate agreements regarding RGGI.  
 In addition, EPA requires facilities emitting 25,000 or more metric tons of CO2e to report 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
These existing reporting requirements could support a supply-side CES in Massachusetts with minimal 
additions or changes.  
MassDEP’s greenhouse gas reporting requirements  
In compliance with the Massachusetts GWSA, the MassDEP promulgated greenhouse gas reporting 
regulations.76 Sources required to report include:  
                                                          
76
 These regulations are at 310 CMR 7.71, available at: http://www.mass.gov/dep/service/regulations/310cmr07.pdf.  
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 Facilities (both power plants and other sources) that emit more than 5,000 sT per year 
of CO2-equivalent; 
 Facilities that report air emissions pursuant to the Massachusetts Air Operating Permit 
Program;
77
 and  
 Facilities that have reported greenhouse gas emissions in any past year. 
These sources are required to report greenhouse gas emissions to MassDEP by April 15th of each year for 
the previous calendar year. Reporting is required for CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, 
hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons. Biogenic and non-biogenic greenhouse gas emissions are 
reported separately.
78
 
Facilities report their greenhouse gas emissions using the Massachusetts Greenhouse Gas Registry, a 
regional electronic reporting system built on the Climate Registry’s Climate Registry Information System 
(CRIS) software platform.79 CRIS is an internet-based application that simplifies greenhouse gas emission 
calculations by automating many of the reporting requirements. CRIS tracks greenhouse gas emissions 
data over time and produces reports for both emitting facilities and interested stakeholders. 
Facilities report their greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Climate Registry’s General 
Reporting Protocol, which requires them to record emissions from their operations in the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico at the facility level. MassDEP further requires separate reporting of emissions from 
each stationary source at each facility. Every third year, affected sources must have emissions verified 
by an approved third-party auditor. Verification is done in accordance with the requirements of the 
Climate Registry’s General Verification Protocol. Units that report CO2 emissions under RGGI simply 
report the same value to the Massachusetts Greenhouse Gas Registry. 
The RGGI “COATS” tracking system 
RGGI is a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions 
                                                          
77
 Facilities that are required to report air emissions pursuant to the MA Air Operating Permit Program include: (1) facilities 
that emit 50 tons per year of VOC or NOx, ten tons per year of any hazardous air pollutant, 25 tons per year of any 
combination of hazardous air pollutants, or 100 tons per year of other regulated air pollutant; (2) facilities that are subject to 
requirements under 42 U.S.C. 7401, § 112 (NESHAPS) (accidental release); (3) facilities that are subject to a New Source 
Performance Standard; (4) facilities that are affected sources as defined in 42 U.S.C. 7401, Title IV (acid rain provisions); or 
facilities in any other source category designated by the EPA pursuant to 40 CFR, § 70.3(a)(5). 310 CMR 7.00, Appendix C, 
(2)(a). 
78
 MassDEP defines biogenic greenhouse gas emissions as CO2 that results from the combustion of biogenic (plant or animal) 
material, excluding fossil fuels. Non-biogenic greenhouse gas emissions include CO2 released from the combustion of non-
biogenic fuel, plus CH4 and N2O released from the combustion of any fuel. 
79
 The Climate Registry is a nonprofit collaboration among North American states, provinces, territories and Native Sovereign 
Nations that sets consistent and transparent standards to calculate, verify and publicly report greenhouse gas emissions into 
a single registry. http://www.theclimateregistry.org/  
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from the electric power sector.
80
 All fossil-fuel power plants with a capacity of 25 MW or greater located 
within RGGI states must hold one allowance for each ton of CO2 that they emit.
81 Each RGGI state issues 
allowances in an amount defined in the state's statutes or regulations. Together, all the allowances 
issued by all the RGGI states make up the regional cap.
82
 Nearly all allowances are offered for sale in 
quarterly regional auctions. States retain some allowances as “set-asides,” which are either allocated to 
sources at the state’s discretion or retired at the end of the trading period.  
Affected sources report emissions via the RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System (COATS). Each plant 
subject to RGGI reports hourly emissions data to the EPA Clean Air Markets Division database, in 
accordance with state CO2 Budget Trading Program regulations and EPA regulation 40 CFR Part 75. 
Hourly data are reported in three-month increments, within four weeks of the end of the quarter. It 
takes EPA an additional four weeks to transfer the data to COATS.83 For example, hourly data from 
October 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012 was reported to EPA in January 2013, processed by EPA in 
February 2013, and published to COATS by March 1, 2013. 
MassDEP’s reporting system covers all sources with a state operating permit and all sources emitting 
5,000 sT or more of CO2, regardless of whether they have a state permit. RGGI reporting requirements 
only affect power plants 25 MW or larger. The choice of which facilities would be subject to a supply-
side CES would determine which tracking system would be the best choice to support a CES applied to 
Massachusetts power plants. Few changes to existing MassDEP reporting requirements, if any, would be 
needed to support a supply-side CES. 
Verifying Compliance with a Demand-Side CES 
As discussed above, there are four basic designs for a demand-side CES: 
 LSEs can be required to meet a “performance standard,” to purchase electricity for 
resale with an average emission rate below a specified level. 
 LSEs can be required to meet a “portfolio standard,” to purchase a certain percentage of 
electricity from certain types of plants, defined in the standard.  
 LSEs can be prohibited from entering into certain types of contracts or investments. 
 LSEs can be required to enter into certain types of contract or investments. 
These four types of demand-side CESs require different types of compliance verification systems. 
                                                          
80
 New Jersey is a former member; Pennsylvania, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Québec have observer status. 
81
 RGGI, Regulated Sources, http://www.rggi.org/design/overview/regulated_sources. 
82
 RGGI, Allowance Allocation, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions. 
83
 See http://ampd.epa.gov/ampd/  
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Regulating LSEs’ supply portfolios: Lessons learned in New England  
Fundamentally, the approaches available to verify compliance with a demand-side CES portfolio 
standard are the same as those researched and debated when New England regulators were seeking to 
develop a system to verify compliance with RPS policies and mandatory electricity labeling or 
“disclosure” rules. These approaches fell into two basic categories.  
1. Regulators could review LSEs electricity contracts. If a supplier wants to use electricity 
from a specific plant, either in its marketing or to comply with regulations, it must have 
a contract with that plant. This option was deemed by regulators to be unviable.  
2. A system of tradable certificates could be established. A certificate would be created 
with each MWh of generation. Suppliers would purchase these certificates separately 
from energy, and they would use the certificates to characterize the fuel mix or 
emissions of the electricity they sold. Regulators ultimately pursued this option, and 
created NEPOOL’s GIS to allow LSEs to report the attributes—such as generating fuel 
type and associated emissions—of the electricity they sell. 
Reviewing contracts 
As noted above, regulators rejected the approach of reviewing LSEs’ electricity contracts to verify 
compliance with RPSs and mandatory disclosure rules. This approach was deemed “unviable,” and 
would be similarly impractical for verifying compliance with a CES. 
While examining the “contract tracking” approach for RPS verification, regulators considered at least 
two different levels of rigor: 1) review all long-term contracts signed by LSEs, or 2) attempt to track the 
contract path of all electricity sold, including purchases from the real-time wholesale electricity markets. 
While the first option is daunting, the second is impossible.  
Electricity is bought and sold in many different ways, with common transaction types including: 
 Unit contracts: purchases from a specific generating unit, typically under a longer-term 
contract 
 System contracts: purchases from a specific owner’s fleet but not from a specific unit, 
typically under a longer-term contract 
 “Spot market” purchases: shorter-term purchases from ISO-NE’s Day-Ahead or Real-
Time markets 
 Wholesale purchases: purchases from wholesale suppliers to meet load (e.g., investor-
owned utilities basic service procurements) 
With the exception of electricity purchased through unit contracts, no single generating unit can be 
associated with electricity purchases. Electricity bought through a system contract could be from the 
seller’s nuclear unit or their gas-fired unit. Electricity bought through the ISO-NE’s spot markets cannot 
be traced to a generating company, let alone a generating unit. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for 
electricity commitments to be traded many times before the energy is generated and used. Contract 
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tracking would require all traders to track attributes through every transaction. The alternative—
tradable certificates—would only require LSEs to purchase attributes from a centralized registry, a much 
smaller compliance burden.  
During the debate over potential tracking systems in New England, at least one system was proposed in 
which attributes would be tracked through contracts where possible, and attributes of spot market 
power would be allocated pro rata to LSEs. There was strong resistance to this approach for two 
reasons. First, purchases from the spot markets are a necessity for LSEs to balance unpredictable levels 
of supply and demand; therefore nearly every supplier would be allocated MWh from these spot 
markets. This would make it impossible for a supplier to market “100-percent renewable” power or 
“nuclear free” power unless they also marketed a separate product with nuclear and coal power in it. 
Second, avoiding spot market and other transactions in which attributes were not trackable would 
increase costs for LSEs seeking to market “green” products. 
Two other reporting requirements have also been raised as a potential basis for contract tracking. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has historically required utilities to file “Electronic 
Quarterly Reports,” summarizing the contractual terms and conditions for wholesale power sales and 
transmission services. Similarly, the North American Reliability Council requires entities scheduling 
interregional power flows to file “e-Tags,” reporting the time of the transaction, the physical path of the 
energy scheduled, including the source and sink control areas, the financial contractual path of the 
energy and the amount of energy scheduled to flow hourly. These systems, however, would be 
insufficient to support a CES in a number of ways, with the most obvious problem being that they do not 
identify specific generating units associated with the transactions. 
Ultimately, New England regulators rejected contract tracking and established the NEPOOL GIS system 
of tradable certificates to support regulations affecting LSEs’ portfolios. GIS is currently used to track 
state RPS and disclosure requirements. The developers of the GIS system, however, were aware that 
some states were considering regulating the air emissions in LSEs’ portfolios. Their intention was to 
design a system that could support such regulations with minimal revisions. 
A system of tradable certificates: NEPOOL GIS 
A system in which electricity is separated from its generation attributes can produce the same economic 
incentives as a system in which the energy and attributes remain linked. With either approach, the goal 
is to allow market pricing to reflect consumer preferences and regulations. If preferences and 
regulations require more low-emissions generation, then the market will provide a premium for this 
generation. When attributes are traded separately from energy, producers receive this premium 
through the sale of certificates rather than with the sale of electricity. Electricity can still be traded in 
many complex ways, but LSEs’ fuel mixes and emissions are determined by the certificates, and not the 
electricity, they purchase. 
Around the world, many certificate markets are currently operating in the electric power sector. In 
various regions of the United States, sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOX) and CO2 allowances are 
traded to achieve compliance with state and federal regulatory programs, and several regions and 
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states—including New England, California, and the Mid-Atlantic—support RPS policies and disclosure 
requirements with tradable certificates. In these programs, each MWh of generation creates a 
certificate in a centralized registry, and LSEs purchase these certificates to comply with RPSs and to 
determine the characteristics of their portfolios for disclosure to consumers. The registry provides a 
centralized, transparent market for certificates.  
The NEPOOL GIS system creates a certificate for each MWh produced in New England, as well as for 
electricity imported into New England from adjacent control areas (the New York ISO, Quebec, and New 
Brunswick). Each GIS certificate identifies the following characteristics of the associated MWh: 
 Fuel source; 
 RPS and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard (APS)84 eligibility within each state in 
New England; 
 Emissions (CO2, NOX, SO2, CO, VOCs, mercury, total particulate matter and PM10); 
 Whether the generator is required to provide EPA with year-round continuous 
emissions monitoring (CEM) reports; 
 Labor characteristics (union or non-union); 
 Vintage of generating unit; 
 Asset information (generator identification numbers used for ISO-NE and EPA, the 
asset owner, whether the generator is active or retired, capacity, etc.);  
 Total MWh generated by a power plant or conserved by a conservation or load 
management resource during the calendar month in which the certificate was 
created; 
 Location of generating unit; 
 Green-E eligibility;85 
 Third-party meter reader; and 
 RGGI status (whether the unit is subject to RGGI requirements).  
The GIS system is used to verify compliance with state RPS policies and New England disclosure 
requirements. For example, in 2012, Massachusetts LSEs were required to purchase GIS certificates from 
renewable sources, accepted under the Commonwealth’s RPS Class I, sufficient to meet 7 percent of 
                                                          
84
 The Massachusetts APS requires that electricity suppliers obtain a certain percentage of electricity from alternative energy 
systems that are not renewable resources. Technologies eligible for the APS include combined heat and power, flywheel 
storage, coal gasification, and efficient steam technologies. 
85
 Green-e is an independent certification and verification program for renewable energy and greenhouse gas emission 
reductions in the retail market. http://www.green-e.org/.  
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their sales. (Suppliers must submit RPS compliance reports to the Division of Energy Resources by July 1 
for the previous calendar year.) Suppliers marketing green products, which include the purchase and 
retirement of additional RECs or costs associated with contracts with renewable energy producers, 
purchase additional Class I-eligible certificates to cover these sales.  
Massachusetts LSEs also used GIS certificates to support the state’s mandatory disclosure requirements, 
which require electricity suppliers to provide customers with information labels. The labels provide 
customers with consistently formatted information for use in comparing the attributes of various 
electricity products. Each label is formatted as a two-page summary that includes the requisite 
information. The March 2013 disclosure label from NSTAR is shown in Figure 7. Electricity suppliers must 
provide customers with disclosure labels upon initiation of electricity services, on a quarterly basis 
thereafter, and upon request. 
Figure 7. NSTAR’s March 2013 Massachusetts Electricity Disclosure Label 
 
In addition to tracking the attributes of each MWh generated in ISO-NE, GIS also collects information on 
the electricity retail sales served within the region. Each MWh of electricity sold at retail results in the 
creation of a “certificate of obligation.” NEPOOL GIS ensures that, in each trading period, the total 
number of generation certificates in the system equals the number of certificates of obligation. 
Currently, most LSEs only purchase certificates sufficient to meet RPS obligations (if applicable) and to 
cover any “green” products they are marketing. At the end of each quarterly trading period, the GIS 
administrator calculates the average characteristics of all certificates not purchased by LSEs. GIS assigns 
certificates with these “residual average” characteristics to the remainder of LSEs’ sales. With this 
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system, an LSE need only purchase certificates to cover its RPS obligations or green products, but its 
entire energy portfolio is characterized by an emission rate for disclosure requirements. 
The GIS administrator also attaches certificates to all electricity imported to or exported from ISO-NE. 
Information regarding energy imported into ISO-NE is provided by state environmental regulatory 
agencies and is based on either independently audited data, average emissions for the control area, or 
data reported to state agencies. Certificates attached to exports do not typically carry environmental 
attributes. The purchaser of the exported energy is free to purchase other certificates to characterize 
the energy, but to date this has rarely happened. 
For information related to generation, wherever possible, the GIS administrator obtains data from ISO-
NE. When relevant and necessary, documentation is provided directly to the GIS Administrator by each 
generator. 
For information related to emissions, certain generators provide the GIS administrator with data for 
each generation month. The requirements for determining emissions vary by generator depending on 
the fuel source and whether the generator reports CEM data to EPA. For generators that report 
emissions to EPA, those reported emissions are simply transferred to the GIS from EPA databases by the 
GIS administrator. Plants that do not report to EPA provide their own emissions calculations to GIS. For 
dual-fueled units, the vast majority of units are to report average emissions for the fuel mix they happen 
to use in a given month, but GIS also allows units to apply for a generator-specific methodology 
approved by state environmental regulatory agencies to attribute specific emissions to each fuel type. 
Thus, each certificate issued for most multi-fuel generating units reflects the average emissions for that 
unit based on the share of each fuel used by the unit during that month. 
On both a quarterly and annual basis, the GIS Administrator posts reports for LSEs, state regulators and 
ISO-NE that contain information on generators’ and LSEs’ generation and consumption, the types of 
certificates generated and retired in the applicable period (e.g., renewable certificates, banked 
certificates, etc.), as well as emissions data.  
Using NEPOOL GIS to support a CES 
Apart from the issues discussed above, it may be argued that the GIS would be the ideal system to 
support a demand-side CES in New England. There are, however, currently important challenges 
regarding the quality of the emissions data in GIS and the transparency of the methods used to calculate 
emissions. Perhaps the most serious concern is that the emissions data in GIS are not verified by any 
regulatory agency, and the calculations behind self-reported emissions, and calculations by GIS itself, are 
not available for review by regulators or the public. Self-reported emissions could be incorrect, and 
mistakes in data reported to EPA may not be caught after being transferred to GIS. In order for GIS to 
support a lbs/MWh CES effectively, air regulators would need to be able to review the emissions data 
reported and the calculations underlying that data. Some changes in data reporting procedures might 
also be needed to bring the data quality to a level sufficient to support a regulatory program.  
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When considering a process of reviewing and changing GIS emissions reporting procedures, it is 
important to remember that Massachusetts is only one of the six states using GIS. Massachusetts 
regulators do not have the authority to require power plants in other states to report to GIS. 
Assuming that the emissions data could be brought up to regulatory standards, GIS could support both 
performance and portfolio standards applied to LSEs. For a performance standard (based on plants’ CO2 
emission rates) no changes besides those discussed above to the GIS would be needed. For a portfolio 
standard (requiring a percentage of energy from units deemed eligible by the standard), a 
“Massachusetts CES eligibility” field would need to be added to GIS certificates. This would be a minor 
adjustment, as certificates already indicate eligibility to meet many different RPS classes in New 
England. 
It would be unfortunate if any New England state were prevented from using GIS to support a CES 
portfolio standard because it could not be brought up to regulatory standards. All of the other 
components of an effective certificate system are in place in the GIS system, and getting these 
components in place was not a trivial undertaking. 
Regulation of specific contracts or investments 
The existing demand-side CES policies in other jurisdictions prevent LSEs from either investing in, or 
signing long-term contracts with, high-CO2 plants. California, Washington, Oregon, and Montana have all 
enacted standards like this. To enforce this kind of CES effectively, regulators must require all LSEs to 
report long-term contracts and investments in power plants. (There has been debate over whether the 
municipal utilities in California, who are not regulated by the Public Utility Commission, are complying 
with the state’s CES.
86
) Currently, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities reviews the pricing 
of supply contracts for the default service retail sales served by the distribution companies, but does not 
review the contracts of non-utility LSEs. Therefore, new regulations on non-utility LSEs—including 
competitive suppliers—would be necessary to support this kind of CES in Massachusetts. 
MassDEP also requires all LSEs to report the amount of electricity that they sell and the associated 
greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, LSEs report to MassDEP the amount of energy sold at retail, and 
they can also report the number and type of GIS certificates purchased. Any certificates from zero-CO2 
sources can be removed from their greenhouse gas calculations. MassDEP calculates average CO2 
emissions for electricity sold in Massachusetts and provides the emission factor to LSEs for use in 
calculating their CO2 emissions. 
There appear to be ways to circumvent the intent of a CES prohibiting long-term contracts with high-CO2 
plants. For example, a series of short-term contracts could be used rather than a long-term contract, or 
a contract for power from a company’s system could be signed rather than a contract from a specific 
                                                          
86
 See: Joint Petition of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club for Initiation of a Rulemaking Regarding 
California’s Emission Performance Standard, November 14, 2011, available at: 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/emission_standards/2012rulemaking/documents/joint-petiton/.  
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high-emitting unit. In general, this type of regulation may be more appropriate to implementation in 
vertically integrated utilities than in restructured markets. 
Figure 8 illustrates the dispatch and investment impacts of a CES limiting long-term contracts or 
investments. Banning LSEs from signing long-term contracts or making investments in resources with 
emissions rates greater than a given lbs/MWh standard, would limit the introduction of new high-
emission resources and result in a greater likelihood of high-emission resource retirements. More high-
emission retirements will mean less of these resources in the bid stack and a shift in dispatch towards 
low-emission resources. Massachusetts distribution companies are already prohibited from entering 
into long-term contracts with or making investments in any generation,87 with two exceptions to 
support clean energy.88 
Figure 8: CES #4: Limit Long-Term Contracts Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
                                                          
87
 MA Restructuring Act, St.2008, c. 169, § 83 
88
 MA G.L. c. 164 § 1A(f) and MA 220 C.M.R. 17.00, 21.00. 
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A CES could also be designed to require LSEs to enter into long-term agreements with renewable or 
other low-emissions generators. Figure 9 illustrates a CES requirement for long-term contracts with 
renewables in excess of the existing mandate in Section 83 of the Massachusetts Green Communities 
Act and the subsequently enacted Section 83A. Requirements for additional long-term contracts with 
renewable and other low-emission resources would result in more investment in renewables. More low-
emission investment would mean more of these resources in the bid stack and a shift in dispatch 
towards low-emission resources. 
Figure 9: CES #5: Require Long-Term Contracts Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
A CES that required long-term contracts or investments in renewable or low-CO2 generation—or long-
term contracts for certificates from these plants—would have an important benefit. It would provide 
revenue certainty to generation projects under development, and revenue certainty is critical to the 
financing of these projects. In comparison, RPS policies based on tradable credits have been criticized in 
recent years, because they provide a less “bankable” revenue stream. Project developers must seek 
capital based on forecasted credit prices, while potential lenders and investors prefer to see a long-term 
contract for at least a portion of the project’s output.  
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Several northeastern states have recognized this weakness of credit-based incentives and chosen 
different approaches. The state of Connecticut purchases RECs from small (behind the meter) 
generators under 15-year contracts via periodic solicitations.
89
 New York implements its entire RPS 
program using a procurement model in which the state procures RECs to meet its RPS requirement via 
periodic solicitations.90 Rhode Island supports renewable energy with a Feed-In Tariff rather than an 
RPS, and Massachusetts procures renewable energy from renewable projects via long-term contracts.91 
An independent review of Massachusetts’ renewables procurement program found that “long term 
contracts for energy and RECs are, and will be, necessary for Massachusetts to meet the goals under its 
RPS…”
92
  
Compliance verification could be quite different for CES designs that limit long-term contracts versus 
those that require these arrangements. Verifying that LSEs have entered into long-term contracts or 
made investments in certain technologies is relatively straightforward: LSEs would be required to 
present evidence of these arrangements. Verifying that LSEs have not entered into certain long-term 
contracts or investments would require LSEs to submit all such contracts or investments for review. A 
proposal for such a requirement would likely meet with considerable resistance, and the review process 
could be quite resource intensive. 
4.4. Shuffling in Demand-Side Policy Designs 
A concern common to both performance and portfolio standards is that CES obligations could be 
fulfilled from existing resources without any impact on dispatch, investment, or—as a result—emissions. 
Adjustment can be made to account for or avoid emissions “shuffling” using careful and correct CES 
design. 
Understanding Shuffling 
Often called “resource shuffling,” LSEs’ ability to buy the CES certificates that they need without 
effecting any change in regional emissions is always a potential concern when a CES-regulated region’s 
retail sales are sourced from a larger supply region. An example may help to illustrate this vulnerability 
in certificate-based CES: If an LSE with 100,000 MWh sales were required to purchase CES credits equal 
                                                          
89
 Christie Bradway, The LREC/ZREC PROGRAM and RFP Results, a presentation to the New England Restructuring Roundtable, 
October 26, 2012, at: http://www.raabassociates.org/main/roundtable.asp?sel=116. 
90
 New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, The New York State Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Performance Report, December 2011, at: http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/Publications/Program-Planning-Status-and-Evaluation-
Reports/Renewable-Portfolio-Standard-Reports.aspx.   
91
 See Section 83 of the Green Communities Act of 2008. 
92
 Peregrine Energy Group and New Energy Opportunities, Study on Long-Term Contracting Under Section 83 of the Green 
Communities Act, prepared for the Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources, December 31 2012, at: 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/pub-info/long-term-contracting-section-83-green-communitiesa-act.pdf. 
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to 25 percent of its retail sales in 2020—10 percent above and beyond its Massachusetts Class I RPS 
obligation—it could meet its remaining 10,000-MWh or 10,000-credit CES obligation by purchasing 
certificates from existing renewables, nuclear, and potentially natural gas throughout the region. As long 
as there were enough eligible certificates from existing resources to satisfy the CES and other relevant 
state regulations, there would be no change in regional emissions. There would be a change in 
Massachusetts emissions from electricity consumption but with no incentive for a change in dispatch or 
investment, Massachusetts’ emission reduction would be exactly matched by an emission increase in 
the rest of New England; LSEs in Massachusetts would report lower emissions associated with their sales 
and LSEs in other states would report higher emissions. 
In our view, this type of shuffling is unavoidable for an LSE-based performance or portfolio standard in 
the ISO-NE region. Shuffling will occur and a Massachusetts CES should be designed with that in mind. 
Therefore, the eligibility terms for a CES must ensure a “binding” CES—a CES stringent enough that it 
cannot be complied with by simply shuffling certificates for existing generation. Table 16 illustrates the 
adjustment necessary to account for shuffling for a 2012 example of a Massachusetts-only portfolio-
standard CES with nuclear generation and imported electricity excluded. In this example, hydro and 
other renewables are issued 1.0 credit per MWh, natural gas 0.42 credits per MWh, and nuclear and 
coal zero credits per MWh. Credits required by other states for their RPS policies are subtracted from 
total credits to arrive at the 27.2 million credits available for the CES. The available CES credits amount 
to 50 percent of Massachusetts 54.5 million MWh retail sales for 2012. 
Table 16: Shuffling Adjustment Illustration for 2012 Massachusetts-Only CES #3: Portfolio Standard with Nuclear 
Excluded  
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
*Hydro includes run-of-river, pondage, and net pumped hydro. 
**Renewables includes wood, refuse, wind, landfill gas, steam, methane, and solar. 
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The share of Massachusetts retail sales that can be satisfied by existing credits—given current dispatch 
and built infrastructure—is called the “binding threshold.” In this example, a CES portfolio standard that 
required LSEs to purchase credits equal to 50 percent of their retail sales or less would not affect 
dispatch or investment and would not change emissions. With CES credit obligations set at or below the 
binding threshold, the price of a CES credit would approach zero in the absence of a regulated price 
floor or an administrative fee built into the CES credit price. 
In Table 16, the CES “stringency” is set to 60 percent—that is, Massachusetts LSEs are required to 
purchase credits equal to 60 percent of their retail sales, or 32.7 million credits in total. At this level of 
stringency, 5.6 million credits would be needed to comply with CES, in addition to the credits being 
produced by current dispatch and built infrastructure. In seeking these additional credits, suppliers 
would bid up the price of low-emission certificates: The more that demand for CES credits outstrips their 
supply, the higher the CES credit price. These higher certificate prices would reduce the marginal 
variable cost (and therefore the bid price) of low-emission generators. The order of the bid stack would 
change such that more low-emissions resources would be dispatched, and the profits to the owners of 
these resources would grow, providing an incentive for more investment in low-emission resources. 
Nuclear Generation 
The effectiveness of a demand-side CES depends on its ability to “bind,” that is, to require more 
emissions reductions than are available from current dispatch, current built infrastructure, and regional 
shuffling. Regardless of whether an LSE-based standard requires adherence to a maximum average 
emission rate or the purchase of credits equal to a given share of retail sales, including New England’s 
nuclear resources as eligible for meeting an otherwise technology-neutral CES obligations will—in our 
opinion—make the CES program ineffective: simply put, assigning credits to nuclear resources would 
drive the binding threshold above Massachusetts retail electricity sales. In a Massachusetts CES portfolio 
standard not designed to be technology neutral—when credit values for each technology are assigned 
based on political choices and not in relation to emission rates—it can be said more broadly that some 
resource type, or group of resource types, would have to be excluded; if both gas and hydro were 
excluded, for example, it might be possible to include nuclear and still bind. 
Table 17 replicates Table 16 with one exception: The example in Table 17 is technology neutral and 
nuclear is assigned 1.0 credit for each MWh of generation. With nuclear treated as a CES-approved 
resource, the total number of available credits in this example is 63.3 million—16 percent higher than 
the Massachusetts retail sales. There is no binding threshold in this example, and not even a 100-
percent level of CES stringency—regulating 100-percent of LSEs retail sales—would result in emissions 
reductions. The inclusion of nuclear in a technology-neutral Massachusetts CES would mean that even 
the most stringent LSE-driven emission reduction policies would not accomplish any change in dispatch 
or built infrastructure. The emissions from Massachusetts electricity consumption would not decline.  
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Table 17: Shuffling Adjustment Illustration for 2012 Massachusetts-Only CES #3: Portfolio Standard with Nuclear 
Included 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
*Hydro includes run-of-river, pondage, and net pumped hydro. 
**Renewables includes wood, refuse, wind, landfill gas, steam, methane, and solar. 
Disallowing nuclear generation from use in meeting an otherwise technology-neutral Massachusetts CES 
obligation would be a necessary condition for making the program effective, at least until there are 
significant nuclear retirements in New England. At the same time, disallowing nuclear generation will 
also prevent “windfall profits” from CES credits to owners of nuclear facilities. Unlike renewables, 
lowering the marginal price of nuclear generation will not, in our opinion, result in investment in new 
nuclear generators in the region. Instead, revenues from a larger gap between nuclear’s bid price and 
the clearing price would be pure profit to plant owners with no investment stimulus effect. 
Canadian Renewables  
ISO-NE imported a net 13.7 million MWh from Canada in 2012: 0.6 million from New Brunswick and 13.1 
million from Hydro-Quebec.93 Hydro-Quebec reported its generation mix as 98 percent renewables in 
2012.94 Table 18 demonstrates the effects on a Massachusetts CES binding threshold of including 
existing Canadian hydro as a credit-eligible renewable resource in a portfolio standard. Here net imports 
are divided into Canadian Net Exports, receiving 0.98 credits per MWh, and New York net exports, 
receiving 0.0 credits; nuclear generators do not receive credits in this example. Assigning credits to 
                                                          
93
 ISO-NE data, http://www.iso-ne.com/markets/hstdata 
94
 Annual Report, http://www.hydroquebec.com/publications/en/annual_report/pdf/annual-report-2012.pdf 
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existing Canadian hydro raises the number of available credits (excluding nuclear) from 27.2 million to 
40.6 million, and the binding threshold for this CES from 50 percent to 74 percent. This means that, with 
existing Canadian hydro included, Massachusetts LSEs’ purchase of credits equal to 74 percent of their 
retail sales or less would not affect dispatch or investment and would not change emissions. In the 
example shown in Table 18, the CES requirement is set at 80 percent of Massachusetts electricity sales 
and the gap to achieving CES compliance is 3 million credits. 
Table 18: Shuffling Adjustment Illustration for 2012 Massachusetts-Only CES #3: Portfolio Standard with 
Canadian Hydro Included and Nuclear Excluded  
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
*Hydro includes run-of-river, pondage, and net pumped hydro. 
**Renewables includes wood, refuse, wind, landfill gas, steam, methane, and solar. 
At present, Hydro-Quebec has 2,468 MW of new hydro-generation under construction (representing 
11.4 million MWh of potential generation) and is planning an additional 2,952 MW.95 The Massachusetts 
CECP’s Clean Energy Imports strategy calls for an additional 1,200 MW of Canadian hydro imports, or 
approximately 10.5 million new MWh.96 Adding this generation to the 2012 example in Table 18 would 
increase available credits to 50.9 million and the binding threshold to 93 percent. 
                                                          
95
 Hydro-Quebec, http://hydroforthefuture.com/projets/9/developing-quebec-s-hydropower-potential, 
http://www.hydroquebec.com/rupert/en/batir/fiche-centrale-eastmain.html, and 
http://www.hydroquebec.com/publications/en/strategic_plan/pdf/plan-strategique-2009-2013.pdf 
96
 Assumes a 100-percent capacity factor on new transmission lines from Québec or New Brunswick. 
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Interaction between a Massachusetts CES and RGGI 
The RGGI program caps CO2 emissions from large power plants in nine Northeastern states.
97 The cap is 
implemented with an allowance system in which affected sources are required to hold one allowance 
for each ton emitted. Allowances are available at quarterly auctions, and sources also are free to trade 
allowances among themselves. Affected sources include all fossil fueled plants with a capacity of 25 MW 
or greater located within a RGGI state. Revenues from RGGI auctions are allocated among the 
participating states. 
Because natural gas prices fell precipitously shortly after the inauguration of RGGI, the RGGI cap has, 
through 2013, not been binding. As illustrated in Figure 10, the cap for each year from 2009 to 2011 was 
188 million sT of CO2 (shown in red) and the recent number of allowances sold—91 million sT—is 
determined not by the intersection of supply and demand, but by the intersection of the (blue) demand 
curve with the (green) allowance price floor of $1.93. Beginning in 2014, the RGGI cap will be lowered to 
91 million sT of CO2, falling by 2.5 percent in each subsequent year, with a “cost containment reserve” 
that releases an addition 10 million allowances if a $4 price (rising in later years) is exceeded.  
Figure 10: RGGI 2011 Supply and Recent Demand Illustration  
 
In all of the graphs that follow, the supply curve is based on the actual allowance cap for the year shown 
under current RGGI policy, while the slope of the demand curve is entirely illustrative and not based on 
data. If demand remains at recent levels, the RGGI cap would be binding by 2015. 
As shown in Figure 11, by 2020 the price per allowance would be approximately $8. 
                                                          
97
 These states are: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont.  
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Figure 11: RGGI 2020 Supply and 2013 Demand Illustration  
 
Demand, however, is not expected to stay constant. The demand curve may shift outward (to the right, 
representing demand for more allowances at every price) due to: 
 Higher retail sales: The RGGI region’s electricity consumption may increase if population 
growth outstrips energy efficiency measures or if other forms of energy use shift into 
electricity (for example, electrification of the transportation sector). Higher retail sales 
would result in a shift in dispatch to accommodate higher generation and, in the longer 
run, investment in new gas and other generation resources. 
 Nuclear retirements: If nuclear (or, although far less likely to occur, renewable 
resources) are retired, dispatch of existing gas and coal generators would increase as 
would the incentive for building new gas and other generation resources. Vermont 
Yankee and Indian Point are both credible retirement risks by 2020.
98
 
 Reduced thermal efficiency: Certain EPA regulated emission controls have the potential 
to reduce the thermal efficiency of existing coal plants such that generation of the same 
MWh would result in more tons of CO2 than before. In this example, dispatch and 
investment stay constant, but the demand for allowances rises nonetheless. 
 Rising gas prices: If the price of fuels for lower-emission generation resources were to 
rise in relation to those of higher-emission resources enough to shift dispatch, MWh of 
generation would stay constant but there would be more demand for allowances. 
                                                          
98
 Indeed, on August 27, 2013 Entergy announce the 2014 retirement of Vermont Yankee, although this information was 
released too late to be included in the modeling described in this report. Entergy Press Release, August 27, 2013, “Entergy to 
Close, Decommission Vermont Yankee,” http://www.entergy.com/news_room/newsrelease.aspx?NR_ID=2769. 
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Figure 12 shows the 2020 supply of RGGI allowances together with an illustrative shift outward (right) in 
the demand curve. In the hypothetical example shown, demand crosses supply at $22 per ton, above 
the 2018 trigger price for the cost containment reserve. This shift in the demand curve results in an 
increase in RGGI region emissions from 78 to 88 million tons. 
Figure 12: RGGI 2020 Supply and Higher Demand Illustration 
 
The demand curve also may shift inward (to the left, representing less demand for allowances at every 
price) due to:  
 Lower retail sales: The RGGI region’s electricity consumption may decrease if energy 
efficiency measures outstrip population growth. Lower retail sales would result in a shift 
in dispatch to reduce generation and, in the longer run, would likely decrease incentives 
for investing in generation resources. 
 New renewables: Investment in new renewables (or, far less likely, new nuclear) would 
shift dispatch away from gas and coal, reducing demand for allowances. 
 Coal retirements: Coal retirements due to EPA regulations will result in additional 
dispatch of existing gas generators and greater incentives for building new gas and other 
generation resources. AESC 2013 projects retirement of all New England coal plants but 
Merrimack 1 and 2 by 2020. 
 Better thermal efficiency: Maintenance and incremental technology improvements 
could increase the thermal efficiency of existing coal and gas plants such that generation 
of the same MWh would result in fewer tons of CO2 than before. Dispatch and 
investment would stay constant, but the demand for allowances would fall. 
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 Falling gas prices: If the price of fuels for lower-emission generation resources were to 
fall in relation to those of higher-emission resources enough to shift dispatch, MWh of 
generation would stay constant but there would be less demand for allowances. 
Figure 13 shows the 2020 supply of RGGI allowances together with an illustrative shift inward (left) in 
the demand curve (compared to the base case in Figure 11). In the hypothetical example shown, 
allowances are sold at the price floor because supply and demand fail to intersect. This shift in the 
demand curve results in a decrease in RGGI region emissions from 82 to 64 million tons. 
Figure 13: RGGI 2020 Supply and Lower Demand Illustration 
 
Massachusetts CES and RGGI Shuffling 
One concern with the effectiveness of certain Massachusetts CES designs is that shuffling of RGGI 
allowances would result in a corresponding increase of RGGI-region emissions that displaced some or all 
of the emission reductions from Massachusetts electricity consumption. In this scenario, compliance 
with the CES would lower the marginal price of lower-emission electricity or raise the marginal price of 
higher-emissions electricity. If these price shifts were sufficiently large to change dispatch—that is, if the 
change in a resource’s price is large enough that it caused the resource to swap places in the bid stack 
with the next higher or lower resource (and that resource had a significantly different emission rate)—
then the demand curve for allowances would shift to the left as shown in Figure 14 (compared to the 
base case in Figure 11) with no corresponding decrease in regional emissions even though 
Massachusetts electricity consumption emissions decline.  
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Figure 14: RGGI 2020 Supply and Demand Illustration of Shuffling 
 
But the shuffling effect—with regional emission increases balancing out Massachusetts emission 
decreases—is far from inevitable. That is, demand for RGGI allowances will not automatically rise to 
assure the purchase of all allowances under the cap: Because the original RGGI cap was set too high, the 
number of allowances sold was consistently determined by price floor, and not the intersection of 
supply and demand; in the historical period, demand for RGGI allowances did not automatically rise to 
meet the cap. RGGI shuffling might eliminate some of the CO2 reduction benefits of a Massachusetts 
CES, but there are several mitigating factors. These include:  
 Annual reductions to the RGGI targets. 
 Market inefficiencies: The RGGI market does not respond perfectly to a reduced 
demand for certificates. 
 The potential for administrators to make the RGGI caps more stringent. 
A Massachusetts CES would likely shift the demand curve for RGGI allowances inward (left); whether or 
not this shift, together with all other changes in supply and demand, would result in regional emissions 
staying steady remains to be seen. It is important to recall that the ability of Massachusetts LSEs to 
affect allowance prices and shift regional dispatch is diluted by the greater RGGI pool; Massachusetts 
retail sales are only approximately 15 percent of total RGGI retail sales. In addition, the elasticity of RGGI 
allowance demand—how much demand for allowances would change at higher prices—is largely 
unknown since prices have not exceeded the floor except in the first two and the most recent auctions, 
and this uncertainty, too, makes the assumption of automatic, “perfect” RGGI shuffling difficult to 
support.  
The RGGI cap and potential Massachusetts CES (or other state emission reduction policies) should not 
be thought of as substitutes, each competing with the other. Rather, state emission reduction policies 
(energy efficiency, RPS, portfolio and performance standards, limitations on long-term electricity 
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contracts) are all ways in which the RGGI cap is achieved—these measures work together as 
complements. State emission reduction policies need to keep up with the annual 2.5 percent reduction 
in the RGGI cap. If they fall behind the cap, there is a potential for a regional emissions increase if the 
cost compliance reserve is triggered. In the end, a Massachusetts CES would have two important, but 
still separate goals: 1) to reduce emissions from Massachusetts electricity consumption—a goal that 
could be met by a binding CES regardless of shuffling—and 2) to reduce regional emissions—a goal that 
might be hampered or possibly even eliminated in the absence of some or all of the mitigating factors 
listed above. 
A RGGI-based Massachusetts CES design 
There is a final potential Massachusetts CES design that would eliminate any chance of RGGI allowance 
shuffling: a requirement that Massachusetts LSEs purchase RGGI allowances equal to a given share of 
their retail sales. Figure 15 illustrates this design. LSEs would purchase and retire RGGI allowances, 
driving up both the RGGI price and the bid price for higher emission resources. The result would be a 
shift in dispatch towards lower-emission resources, lower coal and gas profits, and more coal 
retirements. This CES design would only be effective if—excluding Massachusetts CES purchases—the 
RGGI allowance cap were binding; reducing the RGGI cap would have no effect on regional emissions if 
the actual number of allowances sold were determined by the price floor and not the intersection of 
supply and demand. 
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Figure 15: CES #6: Require LSEs to Buy RGGI Allowances Schematic 
 
Source: Developed by study authors 
While an elegant, simple solution to effective CES design, requiring Massachusetts LSEs to retire RGGI 
allowances may lack political viability. Massachusetts policy makers would need to consider carefully 
any policy with such a direct impact on the RGGI price, and political will would need to be gauged before 
seriously exploring such a policy. 
4.5. Narrowing the Massachusetts CES Design Options 
Synapse reviewed a range of potential CES designs, and discusses their positive and negative qualities. 
Table 19 summarizes these findings. Based on the direction provided by MassCEC and the Agencies, 
power-plant-based performance standards, limitations or requirements of long-term contracts, and LSE 
purchases of RGGI allowances all appear to either be politically infeasible at this time or overlap with 
existing policies. Our qualitative analysis of CES designs identified several disadvantages of 
implementing an LSE-based performance standard in Massachusetts; this type of CES: 1) has not been 
proposed or established in any other jurisdiction, 2) comes with significant administrative and design 
hurdles, and 3) is not necessarily more “technology neutral” than a portfolio standard.  
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Based upon the analysis presented here and the direction provided by MassCEC and the Agencies, we 
have focused the CES modeling analysis on the LSE portfolio standard design. The CES Policy Model 
described in Section 5 was designed to demonstrate the effect on emissions reductions and program 
costs of allowing particular resources—nuclear, large scale hydro, etc.—to be excluded from an 
otherwise technology neutral LSE portfolio standard for Massachusetts. 
Table 19: Pros and Cons of CES Designs 
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The proposed inventory 
method hinges on defining 
the impact of the CES 
policy on the 
Massachusetts greenhouse 
gas emissions inventory as 
the emission reduction that 
it causes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: THE CES POLICY MODEL 
Synapse developed the CES Policy Model to estimate the projected emission, resource mix, and cost 
impacts of the implementation of a CES policy—designed as an LSE portfolio standard—in some portion 
of New England. This new portfolio standard would require LSEs to purchases Clean Energy Certificates 
(CECs) equal to a model-user-determined share of their retail sales. The CES Policy Model projects 
generation by resource for 2015, 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 for a static Reference Case—representing 
the CECP Electrification Scenario, excluding the Clean Energy Imports strategy—and a dynamic CES 
Policy Case, which allows for several user choices regarding policy implementation. 
Because changes to Massachusetts and New England emissions are a key output to the modeling 
exercise, it was necessary to identify a greenhouse gas emissions accounting methodology that would 
accurately estimate the effects of CECP policies. The following sub-section describes the process of 
developing this inventory methodology. 
5.1. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Methods and the CECP 
The current official Massachusetts greenhouse gas inventory method does not award the 
Commonwealth with the full emission reduction benefits of a CES. This section describes a new 
inventory method for Massachusetts that would not only allow for 
accurate accounting of CES emission reductions but would also assign 
emission reductions from RECs to the state in which they are 
purchased. In addition, we present a related process for representing 
the proposed inventory method in the CES Policy Model designed by 
Synapse for MassCEC and the Agencies. The proposed inventory 
method hinges on defining the impact of the CES policy on the 
Massachusetts greenhouse gas emissions inventory as the emission 
reduction that it causes. And not, instead, counting up the emissions 
associated with CECs.  
Current Massachusetts Inventory Method 
The Massachusetts greenhouse gas inventory is required to estimate electric-sector emissions on a 
“consumption” rather than a “geographic” or “production” basis.99 According to the GWSA, 
Massachusetts emissions are: 
                                                          
99
 Geographic- or production-based electric-sector inventory methods assign states the emissions associated with all electricity 
generated within their boundaries, regardless of electricity imports and exports. 
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“Statewide greenhouse gas emissions”, the total annual emissions of greenhouse gases 
in the commonwealth, including all emissions of greenhouse gases from the generation 
of electricity delivered to and consumed in the commonwealth, accounting for 
transmission and distribution line losses, whether the electricity is generated in the 
commonwealth or imported; provided, however, that statewide greenhouse gas 
emissions shall be expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalents.
100
 
The Commonwealth’s Department of Environmental Protection acknowledges that there are multiple 
defensible accounting methods for the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from electricity 
consumption. The 2006-2008 Massachusetts Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory101 (the “Inventory”) 
explains that:  
There are a variety of methods that can be used to estimate the emissions due to 
Massachusetts’ consumption of electricity, including emissions associated with 
electricity generated out-of-state. MassDEP believes it is appropriate to consider GHG 
emissions associated with electricity consumption in regional and more state-specific 
contexts, since, due to the linked, regional nature of the New England electric grid, 
electricity generated in a state is not necessarily consumed in that state, even if that 
state is a net importer of electricity.  
The Inventory notes that two such methods were explored in its preparation, one in which “all electricity 
generated in Massachusetts is used in Massachusetts” and another that involves “determining the 
fraction of New England electricity (in MWh) that is consumed in Massachusetts.”102 These methods are 
described in the Inventory as follows: 
Massachusetts-based (Massachusetts Generation Plus Imports): “[E]lectric sector emissions in this 
approach are based on emissions from Massachusetts power plants plus a portion of emissions from 
power plants in the other New England states that generate more electricity than they use in a given 
year and in the adjacent control areas (New York, New Brunswick, Quebec) in years that New England 
received net imports of electricity from those control areas.”
103
 
Regional-based (Regional Power Pool): “[E]lectric sector emissions in this approach are based on the 
total New England GHG emissions from electricity generation plus GHG emissions associated with 
electricity imported from the adjacent control areas (New York, New Brunswick, Quebec) in years that 
                                                          
100
 MGL Chapter 21N, Section 1. https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2008/Chapter298 
101
 Final 2006-2008 Massachusetts Gas Emissions Inventory, July 2012, Department of Environmental Protection, p.8, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dep/air/climate/ghg08inf.pdf 
102
 Ibid, p.9 
103
 Ibid, p.9 
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New England received net imports of electricity from those control areas; this total was multiplied by 
the ratio of Massachusetts to New England electricity consumption.”104 
For purposes of determining progress on greenhouse gas reduction from 1990, Massachusetts has 
chosen to use the Massachusetts-based method, but for reference reports the results of both methods 
in published inventories.
105
 
The Dilemma Regarding the Current Inventory Method 
Neither of the methods presented in the Inventory fully accounts for emission reductions resulting from 
the full suite of electric-sector policies described in the CECP, which discusses six policies related to 
electric generation and consumption: 
1. All Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency: The effect of this policy (as it relates to the electric 
sector) is to reduce customers’ demand for electricity. This policy’s full impact is 
captured by the existing inventory methods. 
2. Massachusetts RPS: Massachusetts electricity suppliers are required to purchase RECs 
equal to a rising percentage of their retail sales. Suppliers’ REC purchases subsidize the 
construction of new renewable energy resources. A critical feature of this program is 
that suppliers are purchasing a certain attribute of a given MWh of generation (its status 
as “renewable”) but not the energy associated with that attribute. Massachusetts’ 
purchase of out-of state RECs—and, arguably, its responsibility for this low-carbon 
generation—is not fully captured by existing inventory methods; nor, it should be noted, 
is any other states’ purchase of Massachusetts-generated RECs. 
3. RGGI: Massachusetts generators are required to purchase a RGGI certificate for each 
ton of carbon dioxide that they emit. Rising RGGI certificate prices will impact 
Massachusetts emissions by discouraging the dispatch of high-emission generation 
resources located in Massachusetts and in the remainder of New England. These 
changes to emissions would be captured by the existing inventory methods. 
4. More Stringent EPA Power Plant Rules: The implementation of EPA’s more stringent 
power plant rules is expected to result in the retirement of certain generators in New 
England. The resulting changes in emissions would be captured by the existing inventory 
methods. 
5. Clean Energy Imports: The CECP calls for increased imports of low-carbon energy from 
Hydro-Quebec in the form of a new 1,200 MW transmission line. Regardless of 
Massachusetts’ contribution to investments for this transmission line, or other 
incentives provided towards its construction, the existing inventory methods would not 
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award Massachusetts the full emission reduction associated with displacing existing 
higher-carbon generation resources with lower-carbon Quebec imports. The 
Massachusetts-based inventory method would assign the Commonwealth a share of 
Quebec imports equal to its total share of combined intra- and extra-New England 
imports. In the Regional-based inventory method, the average New England emissions 
rate would fall as a result of this policy, awarding all six states with a share of this 
emission reduction benefit. 
6. “Clean Energy Performance Standard” (CES): The CES, as described in the CECP, could 
refer to a wide assortment of portfolio and performance standard policy designs. In the 
course of Synapse’s analysis of CES options, this range of possible policy designs has—in 
consultation with Massachusetts agencies—been narrowed to a portfolio standard for 
suppliers—in essence, a technology neutral version of the RPS. Massachusetts purchase 
of out-of-state “Clean Energy Certificates” (CECs) would not be fully captured by existing 
inventory methods. 
The emission reductions from three CECP electric-sector policies—RPS, Clean Energy Imports, and CES—
would not be fully reflected in the current Massachusetts inventory methods and, therefore, would be 
more difficult to claim as contributions to meeting Massachusetts GWSA targets of 25 percent 
reductions from 1990 emissions by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. Together the RPS and Clean Energy 
Imports strategies account for 6.5 percentage points of total 2020 Massachusetts reductions as 
estimated in the CECP—or about a quarter of required 2020 reductions for all sectors combined.106 
An Appropriate Inventory Method for GWSA Compliance 
Counting CECP electric-sector policies towards GWSA compliance will require an updated inventory 
method. The following method is proposed for this purpose: 
Step 1: Begin with the Massachusetts-based method as described above. While the Regional-based 
inventory method is a better representation of the actual flow of power necessary to serve 
Massachusetts consumers, the Massachusetts-based method has a clear policy advantage: The 
assumption that Massachusetts electric-sector emissions come first from Massachusetts-based 
generation places the main source of emissions within the Commonwealth’s legal jurisdiction: 
Massachusetts can regulate power plants located within its borders. In effect, the Massachusetts-based 
inventory method may afford more control over the sources of emissions.  
Step 2: Adjust Massachusetts-based emissions to reflect New England states’ RPS purchases. 
Massachusetts generation would be reduced by the MWh of electricity associated with RECs generated 
in Massachusetts but purchased out of state. In addition, MWh associated with all six states’ REC 
purchases would be removed from the pool of intra-New England imports available to Massachusetts. 
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Whether these changes would increase or decrease MA emissions would depend on the relative 
emissions, quantity, and direction of transfer of RECs. 
Step 3: Adjust emissions to reflect emission reductions from the RPS and Clean Energy Imports 
policies. Each MWh of low-carbon electricity associated with a Massachusetts REC purchase or with 
Massachusetts’ investment in new Hydro-Quebec imports (from import incentives other than CES)
107
 
would be assumed to replace a MWh of electricity consumed in Massachusetts that has the average 
emission rate implied by the adjusted Massachusetts-based method from Step 2.  
Step 4: Adjust emissions to reflect emission reductions from the CES policy. The CES policy design 
explored in most detail by Synapse is technology neutral (or, alternatively, technology neutral with the 
exception of excluding nuclear generation from receiving CECs). CECs, therefore, are assigned to all 
eligible generation resources and—depending on the lbs/MWh threshold set for assigning certificate 
values—may include resources with emission rates high enough to raise rather than lower 
Massachusetts emissions. The goal of the CES policy, of course, is to reduce Massachusetts emissions 
from electricity consumption. In this spirit, each MWh of electricity associated with a Massachusetts CEC 
purchase from a resource with an emission rate equal to or lower than that of the average 
Massachusetts-based electricity consumption emissions rate in the first year of CES implementation 
would be assumed to replace a MWh of electricity consumed in Massachusetts that has the average 
emission rate implied by the adjusted Massachusetts-based method from Step 3. 
Note that GWSA’s requirement to include out-of-state emissions associated with the electricity 
imported to Massachusetts has always meant that careful consideration must be made in determining 
total New England greenhouse gas electric-sector emissions. To avoid double counting in a New 
England-wide electric-sector greenhouse gas emissions exercise, one would include only the in-state 
Massachusetts electric-sector emissions, excluding the emissions associated with electricity imported to 
Massachusetts. 
Implementing the Proposed Approach in Synapse’s CES Policy Model 
In the CES Policy Model, Massachusetts emissions cannot be modeled as following the Massachusetts-
based inventory method because generation resources in the model are not designated by state. 
Instead, the CES Policy Model uses: the Regional-based method with the adjustments described as “Step 
2” in the previous section; and emission reductions from Massachusetts REC and CEC purchases 
assumed to replace MWh of electricity consumed in Massachusetts at the average emission rate. 
Counting the true impact of the CES policy towards GWSA compliance in the CES Policy Model is 
accomplished as follows: 
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Step 1: Assign Massachusetts all emissions associated with its REC purchases. 
Step 2: Adjust generation and emissions of New England to exclude REC purchases from all six states. 
Step 3: Divide generation and emissions of the New England residual pool into CES-eligible and CES-
ineligible portions using the assumption that only CEC purchases that lower Massachusetts emissions 
are included in the CES-eligible pool. The model would establish the average Massachusetts-based 
electricity consumption emission rate in 2015. CES-eligible resources with emission rates equal to or 
lower than this average would be included in the CES-eligible pool for modeling purposes. CES eligible 
resources with emission rates higher than this average would be included in the CES-ineligible pool, 
again, for the purpose of estimating emissions within the CES Policy Model only. This change in 
inventory would not represent a change in the assignment of CECs in the policy itself. 
Step 4: Satisfy Massachusetts demand for electricity (less RPS purchases) first from the CES-eligible 
pool and second—if necessary—from the CES-ineligible pool. This accounting method provides the 
best possible estimation of the emissions implications of implementation of an LSE portfolio standard in 
the CES Policy Model. 
5.2. Reference Case 
The CES Reference Case is modeled as follows: 
Step #1: Retail Sales 
Retail sales for Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont for 2015 and 2020 are 
taken from CELT-2013 with passive demand response (PDR); 2030, 2040 and 2050 sales for these states 
are extrapolated using the 2015-2020 rate of change. 
Massachusetts retail supplier sales108 for 2015 and 2020 are taken from CELT-2013 with PDR. 
Massachusetts 2050 sales are taken from the CECP Electrification Scenario; 2030 and 2040 sales are 
linearly interpolated. 
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Table 20. Reference and Policy Case Retail Sales Forecast (GWh) 
 
Step #2: Match Generation to Load 
The CES model next matches generation to load using resource mix shares from the 2015 and 2020 AESC 
2013 RGGI Case for model years 2015 and 2020, and the 2028 AESC 2013 RGGI Case for model years 
2030, 2040 and 2050, with the following adjustments to years 2030 and later: 
 Resources expected to retire are removed from the mix. 
 Current statutes regarding future RPS and APS requirements are met. 
 The mix of new zero-carbon resources was selected to take account of modeling results 
from AESC 2013 for 2028, New England renewables potential, and expectations 
regarding the future delivered price of renewables (see discussion below). 
Table 21. Reference Case Resource Mix (GWh) 
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Step #3: Reference Case Outputs 
In addition to the resource mix, the CES Policy Model estimates the following outputs (as shown in Table 
22): 
 New England CO2 electricity-sector emissions (including generation and imports) based 
on the generation detailed above and emission rates derived from AESC 2013 data. 
 Massachusetts CO2 electricity-sector emissions based on the methodology described 
above. 
 Customer rates and costs by category of rate payer.  
Table 22. Reference Case Emission and Cost Outputs 
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Bill impacts are modeled as a change in rates multiplied by a constant typical monthly usage: 600 kWh 
for residential customers, 2,000 kWh for commercial customers, and 200,000 kWh for industrial 
customers. The energy, or basic service, portion of rates is modeled as proportional to wholesale energy 
prices while the delivery portion of rates remains fixed. The percentage change in customer bills 
reported here is the difference in bills between the Reference and Policy Cases, given as a share of 
Reference Case bills. 
5.3. CES Policy Case 
The dynamic CES Policy Case is modeled as follows for the years 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050: 
Step #1: Retail Sales 
Retail sales are identical in the Reference and Policy Cases. 
Step #2: Set Model Parameters 
The CES model allows users the set the following policy implementation parameters: 
 CES Region: What states are implementing the CES policy? Users may choose to include 
or exclude any grouping of the six New England states. 
 CES Load Qualification: Are MLPs required to comply with CES? If MLPs are required to 
comply with CES, each state’s entire load is used to determine CEC purchase 
requirements. If MLPs are not required to comply with CES, the state loads assumed for 
RPS compliance are used for CES compliance. 
 CES Resource Inclusion: Do the following resources generate CECs: Nuclear, Canadian 
imports, New York imports? These resources can be included or excluded from 
generating CES credits. 
 CES Certificate Value: What is the lbs/MWh standard for credits for each modeled year? 
CES credits are assigned a value based on the difference between their emissions per 
MWh and a user-controlled standard. 
 CES Share of Sales Required: What share of retail sales must LSEs “cover” with credits 
for each modeled year? Total CEC requirements depend on the user-designated share of 
retail sales required for compliance.  
Step #3: Model Identifies and Meets CES Requirements 
The model next identifies the net CECs needed to satisfy the CES requirement that do not exist in the 
Reference Case. This value is the total CECs required (retail sales in CES states multiplied by the share of 
sales included—depending on whether or not MLPs need comply—and CES policy’s share of load 
required for compliance) less the number of RECs required to be purchased in the CES Region. 
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The net CEC requirement is compared to the total number of CECs available in the Reference Case (that 
is, all CES-eligible resources multiplied by their credits assigned per MWh, less the credits generated by 
RECs purchased in New England). If the CECs available in the Reference Case exceed the net CECs 
required, the CES policy does not bind: the credits available in the Reference Case are sufficient to allow 
LSEs to comply with the CES without any changes in dispatch or investments in new capacity. If, on the 
other hand, the net CEC requirement exceeds the CECs available in the Reference Case, the model 
identifies and fills this shortfall with new zero-carbon generation.  
Based on this shortfall, the model calculates the GWh of new zero-carbon generation that would be 
necessary to both provide the additional CECs needed for compliance and replace the CECs from natural 
gas displaced by these new resources. The resource mix of new zero-carbon resources is a fixed 
modeling input. This methodology is the result of a key simplifying assumption used in the CES Policy 
Model: natural gas is always on the margin (that is, always determines the wholesale market price of 
electricity) and, therefore, is the resource displaced as new zero-carbon resources are added. The 
rationale for this approach is discussed below. 
Step #4: CES Policy Case Outputs 
The CES Policy Model estimates the same outputs for both the Reference and Policy Cases. Sections 2 
and 5.4 report the results of several combinations of user inputs in the CES Policy Model in terms of 
“deltas”— difference between the CES Policy Case and the Reference Case. 
5.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
The CES Policy Model includes the capability to perform several types of sensitivity analyses including: 
adjustments to retail electricity sales by state; adjustments to Massachusetts RPS requirements by class; 
and limited optimization to meet Massachusetts electricity-sector emissions targets by modeled year. 
Adjustments to retail sales and the Massachusetts RPS affect both the Reference and Policy Cases. 
Optimization to meet emission targets may vary either the CEC certificate threshold or the share of sales 
required, but not both. Results of the CES Policy Model are shown in Section 2 above. In this section we 
discuss results of two sensitivity analyses on these results: 
1. Adjusting Massachusetts retail sales: increasing sales by 20 percent, and decreasing 
sales by 20 percent, in both the Reference and Policy Cases. 
2. Adjusting electricity-sector emissions targets: both doubling and halving the expected 
CECP’s Clean Energy Imports strategy emission reduction target, as well as testing the 
CES policy’s ability to achieve GWSA electric-sector target emissions. Achieving the 
Clean Energy Imports strategy emission reduction target—in addition to the other CECP 
emission reductions represented in the Reference Case—results in Massachusetts 
electric-sector emissions of 12.9 million sT in 2020 and 10.0 million sT in 2030. The 
GWSA electric-sector target is 12.4 million sT in 2020 and 8.4 million sT in 2030. 
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Adjusting Massachusetts Retail Sales 
The CES Policy Case shown above in Table 7 (nuclear excluded, MLPs required to comply, the CEC 
threshold set to 2,000 lbs/MWh) requires a 74 percent share of sales requiring CECs in 2020 and 86 
percent in 2030 to achieve the 5.5 million sT target emission reduction. The share of LSEs’ sales required 
to hold CECs is functionally equivalent when this emission reduction target is replaced by the GWSA 
electricity-sector target emission level: 74 percent in 2020 and 86 percent in 2030. Using this target 
emission level, residential customers’ monthly utility bills rise by 7 percent with respect to the Reference 
Case in 2020 and 10 percent in 2030. 
Raising Massachusetts retail sales by 20 percent (in each year with respect to the Reference Case) raises 
the share of sales requiring CECs to 81 percent in 2020 and 91 percent in 2030 to achieve the 5.5 million 
sT target emission reduction; residential customers’ rates rise by 7 percent with respect to the 
Reference Case in 2020 and 11 percent in 2030 (see Table 23). With 20 percent lower retail sales, the 
share of sales requiring CECs is 63 percent in 2020 and 77 percent in 2030; residential customers’ rates 
rise by 5 percent with respect to the Reference Case in 2020 and 9 percent in 2030 (see Table 24). The 
difference between customer costs in the Reference Case and CES Model Case is not very sensitive to 
relatively large changes in future retail sales. 
Adjusting Electricity-Sector Emission Targets 
The CES Policy Case shown in Table 7 (nuclear excluded, MLPs required to comply, the CEC threshold set 
to 2,000 lbs/MWh) is set to achieve the 5.5 million sT target emission reduction. Lower emission targets 
necessitate lower shares of sales requiring CECs and have lower costs; higher emission targets, higher 
shares of sales and higher costs. When the emission reduction target is halved to 2.7 million sT, the 
share of sales requiring CECs falls to 67 percent in 2020 and 76 percent in 2030; residential customers’ 
rates rise by 6 percent with respect to the Reference Case in 2020 and 9 percent in 2030 (see Table 25).  
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. A Clean Energy Standard for Massachusetts – Final Report 88  
Table 23. CES Delta Results: Massachusetts Retail Sales 20-Percent Higher Than Reference Case 
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Table 24. CES Delta Results: Massachusetts Retail Sales 20-Percent Lower Than Reference Case 
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Table 25. CES Delta Results: One-half the Clean Energy Imports Strategy Expected Emission Reduction 
 
Emissions
2015 2020 2030
New England CO2 Emissions (including imports) 1000 sT 0 -3,474 -3,701
Massachusetts Consumption CO2 Emissions 1000 sT 0 -2,734 -2,734
Massachusetts Consumption CO2 Emissions Rate sT/MWh 0.000 -0.044 -0.043
New England Costs
2015 2020 2030
Supply GWh 1 0 0
Fuel Costs M$ 0 -81 -151
CO2 Costs M$ 0 -37 -39
VOM Costs M$ 0 -21 -24
Variable Costs of All Resources M$ 0 -139 -214
Variable Costs of All Resources $/MWh 0.0 -1.0 -1.6
Variable Costs of Marginal Resource $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wholesale Energy Price $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net RPS Requirement GWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
REC Price $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total RPS Cost M$ 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total RPS Cost per MWh Sales $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net CECs Requirement GWh No Policy 32,266 32,854
CECs Price $/MWh 18.4 28.3
Total CES Cost M$ 593.7 929.1
Total CES Cost per MWh Sales $/MWh 9.6 14.7
Massachusetts Typical Monthly Bills (2013$)
% change from Reference Case 2015 2020 2030
Residential 0% 6% 9%
Commercial 0% 6% 8%
Industrial 0% 6% 9%
-8,000
-6,000
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
2015 2020 2030
G
e
n
e
ra
tio
n
 (
G
W
h
)
Wind
Solar
NG
Biomass
Oil
Import
Other
CHP
Nuclear
Coal
Hydro
Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. A Clean Energy Standard for Massachusetts – Final Report 91  
Table 26. CES Delta Results: Double the Clean Energy Imports Strategy Expected Emission Reduction 
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Table 27. CES Delta Results: Achieving GWSA Electricity-Sector Target Emissions 
 
Emissions
2015 2020 2030
New England CO2 Emissions (including imports) 1000 sT 0 -7,795 -10,179
Massachusetts Consumption CO2 Emissions 1000 sT 0 -5,982 -7,118
Massachusetts Consumption CO2 Emissions Rate sT/MWh 0.000 -0.097 -0.112
New England Costs
2015 2020 2030
Supply GWh 1 0 0
Fuel Costs M$ 0 -182 -416
CO2 Costs M$ 0 -82 -107
VOM Costs M$ 0 -47 -65
Variable Costs of All Resources M$ 0 -311 -588
Variable Costs of All Resources $/MWh 0.0 -2.3 -4.3
Variable Costs of Marginal Resource $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wholesale Energy Price $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net RPS Requirement GWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
REC Price $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total RPS Cost M$ 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total RPS Cost per MWh Sales $/MWh 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net CECs Requirement GWh No Policy 36,549 39,274
CECs Price $/MWh 18.4 28.3
Total CES Cost M$ 672.5 1,110.7
Total CES Cost per MWh Sales $/MWh 10.9 17.5
Massachusetts Typical Monthly Bills (2013$)
% change from Reference Case 2015 2020 2030
Residential 0% 7% 10%
Commercial 0% 6% 10%
Industrial 0% 7% 11%
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When the emission reduction target is doubled to 11.0 million sT, the share of sales requiring CECs rises 
to 86 percent in 2020 and 96 percent in 2030; residential customers’ rates rise by 8 percent with respect 
to the Reference Case in 2020 and 12 percent in 2030 (see Table 26). To achieve the GWSA electricity-
sector target emissions of 12.4 million sT in 2020, and the interpolated 8.4 million in 2030, necessitates 
a share of sales requiring CECs of 74 percent in 2020 and 86 percent in 2030; residential customers’ 
rates rise by 7 percent with respect to the Reference Case in 2020 and 10 percent in 2030 (see Table 26). 
5.5. Additional Data Assumptions 
CEC Price and Zero-Carbon Resource Adoption Assumptions 
Like state RPS policies, for which compliance is satisfied by the purchase of the appropriate Renewable 
RECs, compliance with a CES policy—designed as an LSE portfolio standard—would be satisfied with 
CECs. In the program design modeled, CES requirements are satisfied first with LSEs’ existing purchases 
of RECs; the residual CES requirement is satisfied with CEC purchases. In the policy design explored in 
the model, RECs and CECs are essentially interchangeable for compliance. While there is a market for 
these RECs and future CECs, many of them are also obtained through bilateral contracts. Nonetheless, 
we model all RECs/CECs purchased in each year as receiving the same “market clearing” price. 
RPS requirements are identified as classes or tiers with different target levels, some more restrictive 
than others. Typical technologies that qualify for the more stringent classes are: solar thermal electric, 
solar photovoltaic, landfill gas, wind, biomass, new small hydro, tidal, ocean thermal, anaerobic 
digestion and wave. Other less restrictive classes may include municipal solid waste, and combined heat 
and power. Thus within a given class a number of technologies are competing (more or less) for the 
same market. Likewise with CES resources, any zero-carbon generation resource would be equally 
attractive as a new addition to capacity, at least in terms of its ability to generate CECs. 
For a single renewable technology, the cost of manufacturing the generation components may be very 
similar for all projects, but different renewable projects will have different delivered costs primarily 
because of location. For example, some locations have much greater wind power potential than others, 
may have different acquisition and installation costs, and also may vary in transmission cost. The 
characteristics of renewable resources are more varied than for fossil resources.  
REC and CEC markets encourage the most cost effective resources to be installed first, irrespective of 
technology. Delivered prices for renewable energy are heterogeneous within each resource type. As 
lower cost projects are adopted, we project that the delivered prices of the next lowest-cost per-GWh 
project will begin to converge across various renewable resource types. At any given CES requirement 
level, the current mix of economically feasible projects will likely represent different technologies as well 
as locations. For this reason, in the CES Policy Model the new generation resources required for CES 
compliance are modeled as a single pool of zero-carbon resources with a single CEC price. This pool is 
then assigned to various specific renewable technologies using fixed shares that we have created based 
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on our review of renewables adopted in AESC 2013 RGGI Case and the potential for new renewable 
capacity in New England. 
New Plant Assumptions 
This section presents Synapse’s default or reference assumptions for key economic and operating 
parameters of common types of generic new generating resources used in the CES model. These 
parameter values are based upon our review of the relevant assumptions in the public sources listed in 
Table 29, as well as our experience in various resource planning proceedings and consulting 
engagements. 
Table 28. New Utility Scale Generation Resources—Operational Parameters 
 
Heat rate: Efficiency at which the unit converts fuel energy into electricity. Values are from EIA 2011b, 
Table 8.2 Cost and performance characteristics of new central station electricity generating 
technologies. 
Variable O&M: Variable operating costs not including fuel and emission costs. Values are from EIA 
2011b, Table 8.2 Cost and performance characteristics of new central station electricity generating 
technologies, except for the Solar PV variable O&M, which is based on Synapse expertise.  
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Fixed O&M: Fixed operating cost. Values are from EIA 2011b, Table 8.2 Cost and performance 
characteristics of new central station electricity generating technologies, except for the Solar PV fixed 
O&M, which is based on Synapse expertise. 
Typical Capacity Factor: Portion of nameplate capacity used on average over a year in typical use 
(capacity factor = annual generation / (capacity * 8,760 hours)). Capacity factor of wind and solar units 
vary significantly by location. Certain values are from EPRI 2011, Table 1-2 Representative Cost and 
Performance of Power Generation Technologies (2015), while other values are based on Synapse 
expertise. 
Capacity Value for Load: Portion of nameplate capacity that is credited as firm capacity to satisfy system 
capacity requirements; this value can vary significantly for wind and solar. These values are based on 
Synapse expertise. 
Table 29. New Utility Scale Generation Resources: Source Documents 
 
5.6. Model Limitations and Caveats 
Among the key design principles required by MassCEC and the Agencies for Synapse’s model of a CES 
policy were simplicity and transparency adequate to allow for a tool that could be used to explore a 
wide range of policy assumptions, without significant per-scenario modeling “run” costs. The CES Policy 
Model meets this specification in the form of a streamlined Excel-based spreadsheet, with limited use of 
VBA macros for optional optimization analysis only. 
Simplicity and transparency in modeling, of course, come at the cost of some loss of complexity in the 
representation of real-world conditions. Three modeling assumptions in particular stand out as limits to 
the confidence with which CES Policy Model results may be presented: 
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1. REC and CEC prices converge over time. Because of the large demands of 
Massachusetts’ existing RPS policy and the expectation of heterogeneous delivery costs 
within resource types, we assume that REC and CEC prices will converge over time. As a 
practical matter, in the CES Policy Model there is one set of fixed prices shared by both 
RECs and CECs (in 2013 dollars per MWh): $15.00 in 2015, $18.40 in 2020, $28.28 in 
2030, $10.10 in 2040, and $0.00 in 2050. REC/CEC prices are expected to decline after 
2030 as renewables take the place of natural gas on the margin of the wholesale energy 
market. The greater the demand for CECs (above that of RECs) in early years, the more 
likely that this assumption is incorrect. 
2. Only natural gas is displaced. Newly built (or newly imported) zero-carbon resources 
are expected to displace only natural gas. More CO2-intensive coal and oil resources are 
not displaced by additional dispatch of existing natural gas, or by investment in new 
natural gas or zero-carbon resources. Instead, coal and oil are almost entirely retired by 
2030 in the Reference Case—without the assistance of a CES policy. In essence, natural 
gas is assumed to be always and everywhere (in New England) the price-setter in the 
wholesale energy market. If coal and oil prices fall with respect to that of natural gas in 
the period modeled, this assumption will be incorrect. 
3. The mix of new zero-carbon resources is fixed. When additional CECs—beyond those 
available in the Reference Case—are required for CES compliance, new zero-carbon 
resources are built and natural gas is displaced in the CES Policy Model. We assume that 
the resource mix (the shares of various renewable technologies and imports) of the 
zero-carbon generation added is a policy choice that cannot be well modeled as a 
function of economic drivers. We have based this fixed resource mix on our best 
knowledge regarding future prices and availability of renewables and Canadian imports 
in the future. This model cannot, therefore, offer any policy advice regarding the likely 
share of Canadian imports in that zero-carbon resource mix, or on the impact of the 
costs of these imports or changes to their assumed share. In the CES Policy Model, in 
effect, all newly built or newly imported resources are assumed to have the same price. 
We are not aware of sufficient evidence for an assumption that Canadian imports, 
instead, will have a lower delivered price to New England than will domestic 
renewables. 
